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PREFACE

At the time that the topic of this thesis was conceived, the
author felt very deeply that in order to deal effectively with the
Soviets in foreign affairs, one must understand the enigmatic repre
sentatives and leaders from the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics,
those politicians whose words and actions are often such a mystery to
the Western world, yet could have a very large impact upon it.
Little did the author realize that the completion of this
thesis would coincide with the trials of Soviet dissidents Anatoly
Shchararansky, Alexander Ginsburg, and Viktoras I^atkus.

For those

whose anger and disbelief join with many against such trials, this
thesis should be able to help explain the predicament of the politicj.ans of the Soviet Union and contribute an understanding of why the
*
leaders must carry on such farces of justice.
That against the Human
Rights statutes of the Helsinki Accords, the pressure the United States
has applied for Soviet human rights, and the constant declaration of
democracy in the Soviet state, trials, such as the ones mentioned, were
the only recourse for these men to retain their dignity.
*
Hedrick Smith, in his book The Russians supports this statement
on page
”. . . More startling, I knew of famous Soviet writers who
have the banned, works of Solzhenitsyn and other literary contraband quite
openly on their bookshelves, a sin for which dissidents have been jailed.
But, establishment status provided them protection.”

vii
It’s sad to think that men must play with other men’s lives in
order to raise their stature in their own eyes.
This research attempts to provide a basis for a thorough
understanding of these complex politicians and a glimpse at the
environment in which they must function.

The Author
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ABSTRACT

WHO IS THE SOVIET POLITICIAN?
The purpose of this research is to create a complete, realistic
picture of the members of the All Union Soviet political elite. This
is accomplished by analyzing, statistically and narratively, the
memberships of the All Union political organizations, both in the
Communist Party and state hierarchies.
The elite were separated into three strata, correlating for
the most part with the level of the organization in which they held
membership. The exceptions were members of the upper or top Party elite
who held membership in most or all bodies discussed. One chapter de
viates from the others by narratively analyzing the motives and tactics
of these politicians, including a discussion of the political environment
in which they must function. This study endeavors to generate a thorough
understanding of this complex group.
The Soviet politician is an educated, middle-aged male, holding
a professional position in the state or Party hierarchy, of the Slavic
nationality and very adept at political maneuvering and tactics. He is
also an individual trying to maintain some harmony between the conflicting
natures of his private and public lives; between being a member of a
very privileged class,-while professing to live in a ’classless society;
and between seeing the faults of the Communist society, yet always speak
ing of the emergence of the ’New Soviet Man.’ He is one who is motivated
more by ambition and material success than by Marxist-Leninist ideology.

WHO IS THE SOVIET POLITICIAN?

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND MATERIAL
Most of the scholarly work or published books available in the
field of Soviet politics are devoted to a general survey of the Soviet
political system, a general analysis of top party or government leader
ship, the role and influence of groups in Soviet politics, biographies
of political leaders, and the relation of personal experiences under
the Soviet regime.'*'

Acknowledging the importance of these contributions

to this field of study, one area seems to lack concise, comprehensible
coverage, the Soviet political elite at the All Union level.

The pur

pose of this thesis will be to generate a thorough understanding of
this group— to be accomplished through statistical analysis and narra
tive accounts of the memberships of the various All Union political
institutions.
This paper will consist of six chapters which will cover all
the aspects of the All Union political elite.

Three of the chapters

statistically analyze the members of this select group, while one
deviates from the other methodology by presenting narrative descrip
tions of the tactics and motives of these individuals.

The combining

of the Communist Party and state institutions within the separate
1
Kizhanatham A. Jagannathan, "The Political Recruitment and
Carrer Patterns of Obkom First Secretaries from 1952-1969" (unpub
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1971)i P- !•

chapters was not by arbitrary assignment, but was done because of the
existence of forms of comparability, structural or otherwise, between
the institutions.

Definition of Terms
Before continuing with the material of this thesis, definitions
of terms and several explanations are needed to clarify the contents.
Though the term elite can vary in its definition from source to source,
to discuss each would both lengthen this thesis unnecessarily and be
of no relevance to the purpose of the research.

Therefore, in this

paper "elite" as a noun will refer to individuals belonging to a select
group of people who assume a disproportionately larger role in society
due to their highly responsible positions.

p

Though Milton Lodge, in

his book, Soviet Elite Attitudes Since Stalin, divides the Soviet elite
into five separate types— the full-time Party functionaries, the econo
mic administrators, the military, the literary intelligensia, and the
3

legal profession —

for the purposes of this paper, the elite of Soviet

society will be divided into only two groups, the intelligensia and the
political elite.

The former achieve their status by the functions they

perform; among their members are outstanding or highly qualified indivi
duals engaged in research and academic work, doctors, lawyers, and
journalists.
2

4

The latter receive their status from the positions that

Ibid., p. 22. Mervyn Matthews, "Top Incomes in the USSR:
Towards a Definition of the Soviet Elite", Survey, Summer, 1975? P* !•
•2
Milton C. Lodge, Soviet Elite Attitudes Since Stalin (Columbus,
Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1 9 6 9 )? p- 1if
Boris Meissner, "Totalitarian Rule and Social Change", Pro
blems of Communism (December, 1 9 6 6 ), p. 5 8 . Mervyn Matthews, op. cit.,
p. 24.

if
they hold in society; this group includes those individuals involved
in the power structure of the Soviet Union, the government or Communist
c.

Party apparatus, dealing with decision-making and control over people.''
In several instances, the political elite were members of the func£
tional group elite before becoming members of the power structure.
The concentration of this research is on the political elite,
often designated as Soviet politicians in this research, who hold
membership in the political institutions at the All Union level.

For

the purposes of this paper, the group will be divided into two categor
ies; the Party elite, those with membership in Party hierarchy organs,
and the government elite, those with membership in State hierarchy
organs.

In Soviet society, this group as a whole consists of several

strata, with pay, privilege, status, and power increasing as the level
of elite increases, as will be further discussed in Chapter V.

(The

members of the top political elite, the men of the Politburo of the
Communist Party, may also be referred to as the power elite.)

Each

chapter will clarify the level and category of political elite to which
the memberships discussed belong.
The paper will confine itself to a discussion of the political
elites at the All Union level.

Though information on political elites

at the republic or lower levels might enhance the applicability of the
conclusions of this thesis, it would also force this paper to become too
5

Boris Meissner, op. cit., p. 5 8 .
op. cit., p. 2 3 -

Kizhanatham A. Jagannathan,

^Michael PI Gehlen and Michael McBride, "The Soviet Central
Committee: An Elite Analysis," The American Political Science Review
(December, 1968), p. 1232.

long or too involved in detail*

Therefore, the research has been

limited to include only those members of the political institutions at
the All Union level.
Several terms used extensively in this paper must be defined*
The term social class will refer to a social group in society whose
members share similar' rank and status.
defined in. a narrow sense.

The word professional will be

In the paper, "professional" will designate

an individual with an advanced degree, who holds a highly responsible
Party or government position.

Another clarification which must be made

is the distinction between the terms Russian and Soviet as used in
this research.

Russian will denote only a nationality distinction,

while Soviet designates any representative of the USSR, regardless of
nationality group.

All other terms needing qualification are defined

at their first introduction in the thesis.

Party-State Parallelism
In order to comprehend the levels and the importance of the two
groups of Soviet political elite, a discussion of the dual hierarchies
in the Soviet system is merited.

These two parallel hierarchies are

the Communist Party and the state.
Appendix A.

The parallelism is illustrated in

The role of the Communist Party as described in the 1977

Constitution is "the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the
nucleus of its political system."

7

The Party determines the direction

and policies of the regime, controls the conditions upon which political
or administrative advancement is achieved, and retains control of the
7

John S. Reshetar, Jr, The Soviet Polity (New York:
Row, 1978), p. 153-

Harper &

6
government by determining which Party leaders will hold which
government posts.

8

It is also unhampered by the law.

9

On the other

hand, the state is the practical administrator of the political
system.

It manages the economy, enforces the laws, and maintains the

defense of the country."^

It is the legitimate controller of the coun

try, but the Party's superiority turns this fact into near fiction.
Merle Fainsod illustrates this relationship through comments about the
Supreme Soviet.
In the Supreme Soviet, all important decisions come ready
made from Party leadership. The task of the Supreme Soviet
is not to question, but to execute, to cloth the Party
thesis in a garb of constitutional legality. The result
minimizes the authority of the whole government apparatus.H
With the existence of these hierarchies in this political
system, conflict and tensions often create strained relations between
.the two.

The Party elite desires to control the decision-making in all

areas, especially economic, and have the final say in all appointments
to influential positions; the state seeks the right to run the economy
with minimum interference by Party functionaries and to select personnel without regard to political criteria.

12

Though the state has many

Ibid., pp. 95, 133"Ibid., p. 133*
^ G . Moiseyev and A. Ardatovsky, Political Democracy in the
USSK (London: Soviet Booklets), p. 1.

11
Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Euled (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 38^+.
12
Sidney Ploss, "Politics in the Kremlin," Problems of Communism,
(May-June, 1970), p. 12.

7
bodies that fulfill functions not performed by the Party organizations,
the Party apparatus exercises vast powers and ultimate decision-making
ability, and dominates the vast governmental structure it originally
created.

Recruitment
Recruitment is the core of the Soviet political system, for it
determines the members of the political elite.
this process:

Two methods exemplify

Soviet elections and the nomenklatura-list system.

The

unifying force in both instances is the Communist Party, for it exercises
the final approval over all candidates.

Within the state hierarchy,

representatives up to and including the deputies of the Supreme Soviet
are directly elected through the Soviet electoral system.

The most

misunderstood concept of this system is the Soviet claim that their
elections are democratic.

Herbert McCloskey and John Turner discuss

this Soviet assertion in the following words:
The Communist doctrine bases its democratic claims on the
mystique of the proletariat’s ’historic mission'; since the
proletariat is ’summoned by history' to fulfill a great
democratic mission, whatever serves this mission becomes
democratic by definition. And since the Party directs the
proletarian dictatorship and decides the nature of the
mission, anything the Party wills also becomes democratic,
. . . therefore, the Soviet government can only act in a
democratic manner because it is controlled by the Party . . .
since everything Soviet by nature is democratic, the regime
can legitimately deny that there is any contradiction be
tween democracy and proletarian dictatorship.V*

^ John S. Reshetar, Jr., op. cit., p. 133>
lif
Herbert McClosky and John Turner, The Soviet Dictatorship
(New York: McGraw-Hill, i9 6 0 ), p. 297*

8
Defining democracy in this way, the Soviet state can be declared a
democracy and its elections, democratic.
Though Soviet elections are often considered as non-democratic
by the outside world, they appear to have actual citizen participation.
Universal suffrage and the secret ballot have both been adopted.

15

There is no residency requirement on voting, and nominations for candi
dates may come from several sources.
have a 97 to 99 percent turnout

Elections are even declared to

(refer to Appendix B). However, the

accuracy of these high percentages comes into question in the following
example, as related by Robert Kaiser in his book Russia:

"a man in

Moscow who once worked in a polling station in the capital said that
the number of non-voting adults in his area was about eleven percent;
the Party had ordered in advance what figures should be reported."

l6

Further scrutiny of these democratic characteristics reveals the
existence of only one candidate for each office.

John Hazard contends,

While Western peoples do not consider one-party systems
compatible with the processes of democracy, it must be
admitted that there are parts of the world that are accepted
as democratically governed and in which there is only one
effective party . . . .
It is possible for a system to
merit attribution of the democratic label if there is only
one Party, but there must be a choice of candidates within
the Party.^-7

15
An explanation of the Soviet secret ballot includes this infor
mation. To vote positively, the Soviet citizen will fold the ballot and
drop it in the ballot box. To vote negatively, the voter needs to go
into a private booth and cross out the rejected candidates. To perform
the latter, it creates an obvious reaction from officials at the polls.
However, to be subjected to that is usually preferable to the harassment
one receives if he refuses to vote at all.
1g
Robert G. Kaiser, Russia (New York: Atheneum, 1976), p- 159*
17
John N. Hazard, The Soviet System of Government (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 50.

The

9
In the Soviet Union, this choice does not occur.

Even though the term

for elections in the Russian language, vybory, has a literal meaning of
choices, selections, and alternatives,

lS

only one to three percent of

the population seem to take this contradiction seriously.

These are

the citizens who refuse to vote or vote against the slate of nominees.
Nominations of candidates for the soviets are endorsed by open
meetings of various public and work organizations, but it is no secret
that these nominations are actually decided by the Party nucleus of the
organization in prior, closed meetings. 19

If the candidate for the

deputy nomination is rejected in these pro forma meetings, which has
occurred, the Party officials select a replacement.

20

Most of the

population accept the one candidate practice and contend that more than
one candidate might indicate a lack of confidence in the candidate.

21

Soviet citizens, on the whole, place their greatest emphasis on material
possessions or aesthetic things in life, being content to leave undisturbed
the leadership’s actions in the area of politics.

22

Both Western sources and Soviet writers are in close agreement as
to the functions of elections in the Soviet Union.

23

The purpose of

Soviet elections is not to give the citizenry a choice of candidates for
DL0
Jerome M. Gilison, "Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent",
American Political Science Review (September, 1968), p. 8lf>.

19Ibid., p. 8 1 7 .
2°t^
Ibid.
Ibid.
22
Dan N. Jacobs, ed., The New Communisms (New York:
Row), p. 125•
23
Jerome M. Gilison, op. cit., p. 8l*f.

Harper 8c

10
government positions*

Rather, they are used as a means of ’democratic*

approval of the regime’s policies in order to legitimize it in the eyes
of the world, an educational and propaganda exercise to inform the
people of the Party’s plans.

2b

During the campaigns, past, present, and

future plans are presented to the populace.

If they approve of the

policies, they will ratify the slate of proposed candidates.

If they

want to express dissatisfaction or actually dislike a candidate, they
will either vote against a candidate or refuse to vote altogether.
Soviet elections, as they are, have become a symbol of the regime’s legi
timate position in the world and provide an opportunity for the regime
to test its motivation powers.

25

The nomenklatura or list system is the method by which Party or
elite state positions are filled.

While the exact details or mechanics

of the system are not a matter of public record, there are certain
aspects which can be mentioned.

Each Party organ has a list of Party

or government positions, its nomenklatura, over which it has special
responsibility; the organ then must give its approval before the occupant of a listed post is removed or another chosen.

26

The more important

the post, the higher the level of Party organ in whose nomenklatura it
is placed.

27

The system is hierarchial, as is the Party structure.

The

candidates for nomenklatura posts are chosen from registers of preferred,

2b

Leonard Shapiro, The Government and Politics of the Soviet
Union (New York: Vintage Books, 1 9 6 7 )1 p- 108.
~
25
Dan N. Jacobs, op. cit., p. 125.
26

Jerry F. Hough, The Soviet Prefects (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1 9 6 9 ), pp. 29, 30, 115, 116.
27Ibid.

11
promising individuals at the corresponding administrative levels.
In the case of choosing the delegates for the Party Congress, as an
example, the Central Party organs, especially the Party Organs Depart
ment of the Central Committee, subject to careful screening the candi
dates selected by regional bodies for election to the Congress, and in
effect, can exercise a veto power over those nominated.

29

This hints at

the democratic centralism aspect in existence in this system of recruit
ment; though a lower body approves the nominees for membership in the
higher body, and the nominees are chosen at the same level as the
electing body, the higher body has the right to reject certain candi
dates if it so desires."^
A few key nomenklatura posts, such as the Central Committee
Secretariat, are probably filled by direct decisions of the Politburo.
Other high level organizations, such as the Council of Ministers, are
chosen from their own nomenklatura, exercising total control over the
selection of the candidates for their posts.

The nomenklatura system

works in the selection of candidates for local, Central Party, and
higher state positions.

The system is more a method of assent

20
Mervyn Matthews, op. cit., p. 1329
Federic J. Fleron, Jr., ’’The Soviet Political Leadership System,
1952-19651’ (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, I diana University, 1 9 6 9 ),
p. 1^530
Democratic centralism which guides all aspects of Party policies
and bodies has four main principles which seems to have influence upon
the nomeklatura system also.
a. election of all Party Executive bodies from bottom to top
b. periodic accountability of Party bodies to their Party
organizations and to higher bodies
c. strict Party discipline and subordination of minority to
majority
d. the absolutely binding character of the decisions of higher
bodies upon lower bodies.
These come from the Rules of the Communist Party as quoted in Merle
Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, op. cit., p. 209-

12
than a system of free choice.

The patronage system of political

mobility flourishes in this type of atmosphere, as will be discussed
in Chapter V.

Soviet elections and nomenklatura or list system are the

recruitment bases for the Soviet political elite.

Objective and Hypotheses
The objective of this research is to create a realistic picture
of the Soviet All Union political elite in order to promote a clearer
understanding of their actions in the political affairs of their
country and/or the outside world.

This group will be analyzed through

quantitative analysis of their demographic characteristics and a narra
tive description of their political actions.

Characteristics to be

explored include educational level, occupational status, social class,
age, nationality and tactics.

Four major hypotheses will be investi

gated, along with several minor ones.

The four are as follows:

1.

The Soviet political elite (both Party and government) is
a middle-aged group of conservative men.

2.

Successful careers of the Soviet political elite (both
Party and government) are related to educational levels,
nationality group, age, and occupational status.

3-

The Soviet political elite (both Party
epitomizes the "New Soviet Man."*

and government)

The Soviet political elite (both Party and government)
constitutes an upper class in Soviet society.*
*
The concept of the "New Soviet Man" refers to the Party’s
desire to reshape human nature, to effect extensive changes in the minds,
morals, and manners of the people,-^
create the ideal person who
dedicates himself to the state and Marxist-Leninist ideology, to the
extent of living a deprived personal life. In Soviet rhectoric, the
"New Soviet Man" does not constitute a new class, but rather refers to
the ideal for the entire society. Major hypotheses #3 and #k both can
not be true. This will be established.
31 Karel Hulicka and Irene M. Hulicka, Soviet Institutions The
Individual and Society (Boston, Mass.: The Christopher Publishing
House, 1967), p. 617*
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The minor hypotheses explore topics related to the major hypotheses
1.

The Soviet government elite is powerless in Soviet politics.

2.

All Union political institutions, except the Politburo, have
only "rubber stamp" power.

3- Political behavior as it appears in the Soviet Union demon
strates the desire of the political elite for power and
status in Soviet society.
4. Patronage is the overriding factor in political mobility in
the Soviet political system.
5- Ideological orientation is the guiding force in the life of
the Soviet political elite.
In Chapter Six the conclusions arrived at from the material
presented will be compared with these hypotheses.
findings will then be presented.

A discussion of the

CHAPTER II

THE SUPREME SOVIET AMD THE PARTY CONGRESS
According to the Soviets, the ’highest organs of power' in the
dual hierarchies of the Soviet political system are the Supreme Soviet
and the Congress of the CPSU.’*' Though actual power for both bodies
differs greatly from theoretical power, their representative natures
and large turnover rates seem to support the Soviet contention of mass
*
participation of the populace in the operation of the Soviet polity.
Membership in these assemblies is considerable, 1,517 at the 197^
Supreme Soviet session and ^i-,998 at the 1976 Congress.

With the

comparability of these two organs as to type and purpose, the presenta
tion of both in the same chapter seems merited.
The purpose of this paper is neither to discuss nor dispute
the Soviet assertions of the functions of the Party and state institu
tions.

It is to analyze the type of individual v/ho gains membership in

one of these institutions.

Before delving into the data on the member

ship of each organ, a brief explanation of the organ and its purpose
will be offered.

The state body or bodies will be presented first since

they are the least powerful.

The discussion of the respective Party

*
Participation by the citizens in decision-making and bill
writing in the Soviet political system.
'*'John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York:
Row, 1978), pp. 112, 1 8 6 .

l*f

Harper &
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organisations will follow, concluding with a summary of the
characteristics of those chosen as members of the institutions dealt
with in the chapter.

The Supreme Soviet
From the 1977 Constitution, the Supreme Soviet receives its
description as the "highest organ of state power11 in the USSR.

2

It

consists of two 1equal1^ chambers, the Soviet of the Union and the
Soviet of Nationalities.

The former contains one representative for

about every 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 people, though its membership is now stabilized at
767 deputies.

Representation in the latter follows a specific formula,

32 deputies from each Union Republic, 11 deputies from each Autonomous
*
Republic, 5 deputies for each autonomous oblast, and 1 deputy for
*

each okrug.
chambers.

The 1977 Constitution calls for equal memberships in the

Table 2-1 shows that this is presently being approached.

The constitutional powers of the Supreme Soviet range from
exercising all legislative power and approving budgetary and economic
plans to directing the defense and international relations of the
Soviet Union.

4

However, with the assembly meeting only eight to ten

*
Oblast is translated as province and okrug is translated as
area, either electoral or ethnic.
^Ibid.
3

The Soviets contend equality of the chambers. However, the
Soviet of the Union has more Communist Party members and Party officials
in its membership and, therefore, it is described by many as 'more than
equal' to its counterpart.
4
G. Moiseyev and A. Ardatovsky, Political Democracy in the USSR
(London: Soviet Booklets), p. 1.

TABLE 2-1

NUMBER OF DEUPTIES IN EACH CHAMBER
OF THE SUPREME SOVIET

Soviet of
the Union

Soviet of
Nationalities

Total

First - 1937

569

574

1,1^3

Second - 19^6

682

657

1,339

Third - 1950

678

638

1,316

Fourth - 195^

708

639

1,3hi

Fifth - 1958

738

6^-0

1 ,3 7 8

Sixth - 1962

791

652

1,M*3

Seventh - 1966

767

750

1,517

Eighth - 1970

767

750

1,517

Session

SOURCE: M. Saifulin, The Soviet Parliament. (Moscow: Progress >Publishers, 1 9 6 7 ), p- 35; Pravda, July 15, 1970, pp. 2-3, as illustrated
in Peter Vanneraan, ’’The Supreme Soviet of the USSR” (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 1^5-
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days a year, it has become but a legalizing instrument for Party
approved laws and resolutions-

An example of this formal nature of

the Supreme Soviet is illustrated in the following:
• . . on the second day of the first session of the
Eighth Supreme Soviet, in July 1970, the following
agenda was completed:
1. election of a new Politburo
2. election of a new Council of Ministers (com
pleted with no discussion)
3- an All-Union bill concerning basis labor
legislation was read, 'debated’, and ap
proved . . . in one hour and a half; this
was the first comprehensive labor law passed
since 1 9 2 2
4. discussion of various questions of foreign
policy with two related resolutions passed
. . . Since all the agenda items for the session had
been exhausted, the session was declared closed that
evening.^
Though the Soviets dislike the usage of the term, the Supreme
Soviet could be said to be a 'rubber stamp' organization.

Laws do not

orginate on the floor of the chambers and up to the 1970's, not a single
*
bill in a Commission or sub-Commission had been individually or group
£
initiated, though by law, the deputy has this right.
The only time actual discourse may take place is in committee
for deliberating on the details of legislation which implement general
Party directives.

An example of this type of discussion follows:

A sub-Commission drafts the fundamentals of the Public Health
Law. Its Chairman, N. N. Blokhin, is a prominent surgeon and
scholar, and no newcomer to the Supreme Soviet, having been a
deputy in its two previous sessions. Invited to this sitting
by the commission were economists, trade unionists, jurists,
*
In the Soviet government, a committee of one of the chambers
of the Supreme Soviet is referred to as a Commission.
5
Roy A. Medvedev, On Soviet Democracy (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1975), PP- 133-134.
Ibid., p. 132.
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financial experts and medical men. Every line of the
projected law was closely scrutinized. Purely stylistics
alterations were made, then a few substantive ones. An
argument broke out: may a patient be operated on without
his consent or that of his close relatives?
How are we to get the required consent if, say, the
patient is in a state of shock? The relatives may be away
or their whereabouts unknown. The doctor simply has no
time.
I know of no country where legislation allows for
forcible operations.
Take an intestinal perforation. You may not get the
patient’s consent until it’s too late. To save life the
surgeon should be allowed to operate . . . .
I disagree. During the war some wounded refused to
be amputated. And though not all, many did get well.
Don’t you understand that I cannot saw off a man's leg
without his consent?
There are all kinds of cases. You cannot prescribe
for all of them.
That should be legislatively formalized, lest we tie
the hands of our doctors in emergencies. When an operation
is urgent, the surgeon should not have to search for re
latives or guardians.
They put that down: a doctor may, is obligated even,
to decide for himself, but this in ’exceptional cases’
only, when delay 1imperils the patient's life' and when
'obtaining consent appears impossible.’ This, eventually,
was the formula that became law.7
All voting in Commissions, sub-Commissions, and on the floor of
the chambers is done by "raising the forearm, making a right angle at

g
the elbow."

All votes are declared unanimous.

With 72 percent to 76 percent of the deputies being members of
the Communist Party (see Table 2-2), Party membership is a major con
sideration in deciding upon nominees for deputy positions.

Whereas most

7
Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), pp. 262-63-

g
Robert G. Kaiser, Russia (New York:

Atheneum, 1976), p. 136.

TABLE 2-2

PARTY MEMBERSHIP IN TEE SUPREME SOVIET
1937-1970

Communists, as Percent of All Deputies

Year Elected

Soviet of
the Union

Soviet of
Nationalities

1937

8 l.O

7 1 .0

19^6

Sk.k

77 - 6

1930

8 3 .3

8 1 .3

195^

7 9 .8

73.9

1938

7 6 .3

73.8

7 6 .0

19 6 2

7 3 .2

76A

73-*+

1966

7 ^ .7

73-7

73.2

1970
197*+

-

Combined

-

72.3

-

75-0

SOURCE: Pravda and Izvestia as Illustrated in Peter Vanneman,
"The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 123.
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of the remaining twenty-four to twenty-eight percent of the membership
*
are Konsomol officials, up to ten percent may be non-Party personnel.
However, the latter must have Party approval.

9

A further indication of

Party control of this body is illustrated by Table 2-3-

Though a

decrease has occurred in the membership of the Party and state officials,
they still make up roughly one-third of the membership, while forty
percent of the Central Committee members hold key Supreme Soviet posi
tions.

The highest organ of state power is a Party dominated and

controlled body.
Second only to Party membership, the level of education seems
to have become the most important characteristic in examining the quali
fications of nominees.

Table 2-k gives the percentages for levels of

education for deputies during a twenty-four year period.

For those with

only a primary education, the figure has decreased by twenty-nine
percentage points, whereas for those completing higher level education,
it has increased by nine percentage points.

Between 193*+ and 1938, the

drop in the percentage for higher level education could be attributed to
the power struggle in the Politburo at that time, but the increase in
this area between 1938 and 1962 is due to Khrushchev’s influence in
recruiting more educated personnel for government positions.

With the

combined percentages in Table 2-*f for secondary or higher levels of
education showing a twenty percentage point increase from the fifth
session to the eighth, this probably reflects a corresponding emphasis
on higher levels of education occurring in Soviet society at the same tim
*
Konsomol is the name of the Communist Youth Organization.
9
Everett M. Jacobs, "Soviet Local Elections: What they are and
What they are not", Soviet Studies (July, 1970) i P- 70.

TABLE 2-3

PERCENTAGE OF PARTY-STATE OFFICIALS AND CENTRAL
COMMITTEE MEMBERS HOLDING KEY POSITIONS
IN THE SUPREME SOVIET

Session
195^

State

Party
-

-

Central
Committee
2 b%

1958

1 9 .0

1 6 .0

19 6 2

1 9 .0

1 6 .0

19 66

1 8 .0

15-1

3b%

1970

1 7 .2

l^f.3

hi. 3 %

-

SOURCE: Pravda and Izvestia as illustrated in Peter Vanneman,
’’The Supreme Soviet of the USSR” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 139*
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TABLE 2-b

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THE SUPREME SOVIET DEPUTIES

Session

-

Third

Fourth

Fifth

Sixth

Seventh

Eighth

39%

h 8%

hy/o

b9%

50 %

b 8%

7/o

7%

6%

b%

y%

y%

22 %

17/o

12 %

1 7/o

19 %

30 %

—

10%

20 %

20%

23 %

17 %

32%

18 %

19%

11 %

6%

3%

Level:
Higher
Incom.
Higher
Secondary
Incom.
Sec.
Primary

SOURCE: Verkhovni Sovet (Vosmogosziva), statucheskii sbornik
(Moscow: 1970), pp. kO-kl, as illustrated in Peter Vanneman, "The
Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania
State University, 1972), P- 136.
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Occupation proves to be a difficult characteristic to analyze
for the deputies of the Supreme Soviet (refer to Table 2-3)-

For the

years 1962 and 1 9 6 6 , precise figures in all categories are available.
However, for the more recent sessions, this is not true.

With the Soviet

biographer’s tendency not to report white collar classifications,^ and
the percentages in these areas missing, it seems that the Soviets are
becoming more and more hesitant to admit white collar status and repre
sentation.

This conclusion receives further support if the reported

worker representation is analyzed.

The Supreme Soviet’s compositional

pattern is allegedj.y a cross section of the best in every occupation.
Since the worker category dominates the occupied population of the Soviet
Union, it should also dominate the representation in the Supreme Soviet.
Up until 1974, its status in the assembly was grossly underrepresented.
In 1974, its proportion of membership increased, but remained well below
its proportion of the occupied population in the Soviet Union.

12

If the

unknown percentages of Table 2-3 are intepreted as belonging in the white
collar, category, then this group has a 39-7 percent representation in
1970 and 48.4 percent representation in 1974.

Both figures are well

above the corresponding percentages for this occupational group in the
Soviet Union.

The Supreme Soviet does not mirror occupied Soviet society.

It possesses a disproportionately high share of white collar representa
tion at the expense of worker representation.
*^Renee Grace Loeffler, ’’The Education of the Soviet Party Execu
tive” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornwell University, 1973)r P- 162.
Ms. Loeffler contends in her dissertation that Soviet biographers have a
tendency to leave out reference to white collar social origin or social
class membership.
^Peter Vanneman, op. cit., p. 157*
]?
“Roger A. Clarke, ”The Composition of the USSR Supreme Soviet”,
Soviet Studies (July, 1 9 6 7 ), p. 57*

TABLE 2-5
OCCUPATIONAL REPRESENTATION AMONG SUPREME SOVIET DUTIES

Category

1962

1966

1970

Workers

21 $

20 %

21.7$

3 2 .8 $

Peasants

15

17

1 8 .6

1 7 .8

Full-time Party

19

18

1 7 .2

17

Full-time Govt.

16

15

15.1

14.1

Military

4

4

3.8

3.7

Farm Directors

8

8

5-3

Economic Managers

1

3

-

Other White Collar

13

11

3

3

1974

White Collar

Unknown

-

-

SOURCE: Pravda and Izvestia, Verkhovni Sovet (Vosmogosoziva),
statucheskii soornik (Moscow: 1970) as illustrated in Peter Vanneman,
nThe Supreme Soviet of the USSR” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 123- John S. Reshetar, Jr.,
The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 183*
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Unlike occupational status, the nationality composition of
the Supreme Soviet more closely coincides with this aspect in Soviet
society as a whole.

The body is dominated by the Slavic groups, the

Russians, the Ukrainians, and the Belorussians, just as the population
as a whole is.

Table 2-6 illustrates Supreme Soviet nationality

representation for the years 1 962 and 1 9 6 6 , as compared to the 1959
population census.

In 19591 76.28 percent of the population was Slavic,

but in the Supreme Soviet, only 6l-7 percent and 59*39 percent, respec
tively, were.

Though dominating the assembly, the Slavic group was

obviously underrepresented.

Most of the minority groups, on the other

hand, were overrepresented.

The political leadership, however, realizes

the importance of having a communication link with the many nationalities
of the country, plus foster the feeling in the population that they do
have an impact on decision-making.

This overrepresentation of minorities

on this rather powerless body might be deliberate.

It also serves as

excellent evidence to the Soviet claim that their assembly is the most
representative in the world.

13

An analysis of the age of deputies represents an insight into
the Soviet political system as a whole.

Table 2-7 illustrates this

characteristic from the first through eighth session.

Two trends are

evident, the gross increase in the under 30 group between 1 9 5 0 and 1 9 7 0 ,
and the smaller increase in the over 60 group in the 1960!s.

The first

trend implies the rising importance of recruiting younger cadres into
the operation of the state.

The greatest jump between the fifth and

sixth sessions can be traced to Nikita Khrushchev’s efforts to recruit
13Peter Vanneman, op. cit., p. 157-

TABLE 2-6

NATIONAL REPRESENTATION IN THE U.S.S.R. SUPREME SOVIET
USSR Supreme Soviet
1966
1962
Percent
Percent

Population 1939
Nationality

Percent

Russians
Ukrainians
Belorussians
Uzbeks
Georgians
Azerbaijanis
Lithuanians
Moldavians
Latvians
Kirghiz
Tadzhiks
Armenians
Turkmens
Estonians
Finns
Jews
Poles
Bashkirs
Buriats
Kabardinians
Kalmyks
Karelians
Komis
Maris
Mordvinians
Ossetians
Tatars
Tuvinians
Udmurts
Chechens
Chuvashes
Yakuts
Kara-Kalpaks
Abkhazians
Others

34.65
17.84
3.79
2 .8 8
1.29
1.41
1 .1 1
1 .0 6
O .6 7
0.46
0.67
1-33
0.48
0.47
0.04
1 .0 9
0 .6 6
0.47
0 .12.
0 .1 0
0.03
0 .0 8
0 .2 1
0.24
0 .6 2
0 .2 0
2.38
0.03
0 .3 0
0 .2 0
0 .7 0
0 .1 1
0 .0 8
0.03
2.42

TOTAL

1 0 0 .0 0

43-38
14.62
3-74
2 .9 8
3-19
3 -1 2
2 .0 8
1.32
1.46
1-32
1.94
2.77
1-32
1 .8 7
o.i4
0.33
0 .2 8
0 .8 3
0.33
0.42
0.41
0.33
0.33
0.42
0.49
0.90
0.97
0-53
0.42
0.33
0 .6 2
0.53
0.42
0.49
2.36

42.32
1 3 -1 8
3-69
3-43
3-30
3 -1 0
2 .1 1
1.43
1.83
1-52
2.31
3 -1 6
1.78
1.91
0.07
0-33
0.33
0.39
0.39
0.40
0.40
0.40
0.39
0.33
0.46
0.92
1-19
0.33
0.40
0.40
0.33
0.33
0.33
0.46
2.77

1 0 0 .0 0

1 0 0 .0 0

SOURCE: Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Rulers and the Ruled,"
Problems of Communism, XVI, 5 (September-October, I9 6 7 ), 23.
26

TABLE 2-7
DEPUTIES OF SUPREME SOVIET BY AGE GROUP

Under 30

31-40

41-50

5 1 -6 0

1 9 5 0 - 3 rd

6.5$

24.8%

49.9^

14.5%

4.3#

1954 - 4th

8 .2

19.2

44.4

2 3 .6

4.6

1958 - 5th

7-7

2 1 .8

40.5

2 5 .2

4.8

1 9 6 2 - 6 th

14.5

2 8 .1

3 0 .1

22.9

4.4

1966 - 7 th

1 2 .0

2 8 .6

27-7

25-4

6.3

1970 - 8 th

18.5

2 3 .0

25-5

21.7

11.3

Session

Over 60

SOURCE: Verkhovni Sovet(Vosmogosoziva), statucheskii
shornik (Moscow: 1970), p. 4o. A s illustrated in Peter Vanneman,
1fThe Supreme Soviet of the USSR” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Pennsylvania State University, 1972),p. 144
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young, innovative people into governmental positions.

The second trend

illustrates the beginning of the dominance of the Over 60 group in the
Supreme Soviet, a trend that developed in the other political institu
tions as well.

With the median age fluctuating between the 31-40 group

and 41-50 group, plus the government and Party elite holding deputy
positions and being members of the older generation, the rising of the
median age seems a clear possibility.
In keeping with Marx's ideal of mass participation in the
central government, the tenure of the average deputy sitting in the
14
Supreme Soviet is not secure.
Only the highest Party and government
officials and non-political eminent persons are likely to be re-elected
to the succeeding sessions of the Supreme Soviet. 15

The turnover rate

in membership has reached as high as 70 percent (see Table 2-8).

This

renewal rate influences most the female and less educated or non-Party
deputies.

16

It could be speculated that this large turnover rate helps

prevent the formation of deputy groups that could disagree with the poli
cies of the Party elite.

Supreme Soviet membership provides an excellent

propaganda tool for the Soviets.

Its turnover rate appeal's to 'prove1

mass participation in the operation of its government.
Distinguished service is another consideration for membership.
The Party is generally fond of symbolism and ceremony.
those who bring honor to the Motherland.

Therefore, it often awards such

people nominations as deputies for the Supreme Soviet.
3.4
John S. Reshetar, Jr., op. cit., p. 183*
15?Ibid.
*^Ibid., p. 184.

It is proud of

In the 1974

TABLE 2-8

TURNOVER RATE FOR SUPREME SOVIET DEPUTIES

Year

Percentage

1958

62.3

1 962

7 0 .0

19 6 6

6 3 .A

1975

57-2

SOURCE: John S. Reshelar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York:
Harper & Row, 1978), p. iSk,
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session, over 73 percent-of the deputies were so decorated, including
milkmaids, tractor drivers, coal miners, and factory workers.

17

The

honor of serving as a deputy is enhanced by benefits such as an
honorarium of 1 0 0 rubles a month, plus his regular salary while
attending sessions, and free travel on rail, water, and air, including
all expenses in Moscow.

18

In addition, a member cannot be prosecuted

or arrested without the consent of his Soviet or in periods between
sessions, without the consent of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

19

However, if the Party elite decides to demote or retire an official
and the official is a deputy, formal channels are often dispensed with.
To understand further the type of individual recruited as a
deputy, various aspects of the position should be mentioned.

Deputies

are elected directly by the people and serve for a period of four years.
They attend the session to listen and not participate, with the possible
exception of minor participation in Commissions or sub-Commissions.
Roy Medevev, a dissident historian, describes their non-participation
in chambers in the following words:
In the years of the existence of the Supreme Soviet, there
has not been a single occasion on which members have

1 7 Ibid., p. 183.

3.8Mervyn Matthews, ’’Top Incomes in the USSR:

Towards a Defini
tion of the Soviet Elite”, Survey (Summer, 1973)» P- 119G. Moiseyev and A. Ardatovsky, op. cit., p. 3-
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criticized any bill while sitting in chambers. They have
never rejected a bill or returned one for an amendment.
The major job of a deputy lies in the function of ombudsman for
his constitutents, a spokesman of the criticism from his constituents
to the government.

Government ministers are required to reply to deputy

inquiries, in person, within a month’s time, concerning the criticism
and state what action has taken place to remedy the grievance.

The

regime allows this channeling of personal grievances about bureaucratic
ineptitude so as to recognize them before they accumulate into dissatisfaction with the political system as a whole.

21

Deputies in turn repre

sent the regime and its policies to their constituents and may hold
conferences to facilitate this.
The average Soviet politician in the Supreme Soviet is a Party
member, but not an official.

He may or may not be a professional, but'

he is educated.

He is middle-aged and holds either a white collar or

worker position.

He has more than likely performed some meritorious

service to his country, republic, or local Party organization.

His

nationality is possibly Slavic and chances are he will serve in only
one session.

While he may contribute some to the discussions in Com

missions or sub-Commissions, he does not participate in chambers, except

20
Roy A. Medvedev, op. cit., p. 132. He goes on to say, ’’This
should not be taken to mean either that the bills as submitted are
perfect or that no deputies ever have serious doubts about them. More
over, it is clear from the experience of the past ten to fifteen years
that many bills passed by the Supreme Soviet have been ill-advised or
seriously defective in some way or another. Sooner or later it has been
necessary either to rescind them or to make substantial changes. But
this has never happened on the initiative of the Supreme Soviet or any
of its commissions . . .
21
Peter Vanneman, op. cit., p. 2^7*
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to register his vote.

With the Communist definition of democracy and

its minority representation, the Supreme Soviet could possibly be
designated as a "democratic'1 institution.

The Party Congress
The Party Congress is regarded as the highest organ of the
Communist Party by the Party Statutes.
years.

It is convened every five

Though originally the Congress was an arena for discussion,

deliberations, and spirited debates, at present, because of the sheer
number of persons in attendance, the Congress is neither designed for
nor capable of deciding important issues.

22

In theory, the delegates

have the right to criticize leadership and their policies at the
Congress, the right to formulate new policies, and elect whom they
choose to lead the Party; however, these democratic potentials have
never materialized.

23

The Congress functions merely as a sounding

board, a rally of the faithful, a platform from which leadership
announces new policies, goals, and modifications in the rules and
programs, along with obtaining formal approval of new policies or
shifts in the top Party command.

2b

Voting is alv/ays unanimous and no

signs of policy disagreement surface.

In 1971 1 Leonard Schapiro

described the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU as ". . . bland,
22

John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York:
& Row, 1978), p. 112.
23

Harper

Karel Hulicka and Irene M. Hulicka, Soviet Institutions The
Individual and Society (Boston, Mass.: The Christopher Publishing
House, 1987)» p- 38.
2k

Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1 9 6 3 ), pp. 2 1 7 -2 .
18.
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uneventful, colorless, and as smooth as a play being performed on
stage for the third year running."

25

In the psychological sense, the

Party Congress is symbolic of the alleged unity at home and the
ostensible support which Moscow enjoys in the international communist
movement.

26

Despite the genuine lack of debate and pro forma nature

of voting, the Congress provides the delegates with a sense of parti
cipation, however passive and modest, and with an opportunity to see
and hear the Party leaders.

27

Two kinds of delegates attend Party Congresses.

Voting ones

represent Party members, and non-voting ones, candidate Party members.
The formula for their election is much more complicated than for their
colleagues in the Supreme Soviet.

The following information explains

the election process and norms of representation of delegates to the
Party Congress:
Republic
RSFSR
Large Non-Russian
Small Non-Russian
Military Units Abroad

Delegates chosen by
Oblast Party Conferences
Krai* Party Conferences
Oblast Conference
Republic Party Conferences
Select own delegates28

Nomination for delegates is through a list system.

Such lists are

drawn up by nominating committees which are dominated by Party secre
taries.

The list is then presented to the assembly for approval.
*
Krai translates territory.

25
Leonard Shapiro, "Keynote-Compromise", Problems of Communism,
(July-August, 1 9 7 1 ), p- 2 .
26

Illinois:

Robert J. Osborn, The Evolution of Soviet Politics (Homewood,
The Dorsey Press” 197^)? pp« 212-213-

27
John S. Reshetar, Jr., op. cit , p. 119po

Ibid., p. 112.

3**
Rarely is any name on the list not approved.

Like the Supreme Soviet,

the Party likes the facade of broad participation.

For this reason,

delegates are likely to serve on only one or two Congress.

In 1971?

7^.4 percent of the delegates were attending their first conference,
whereas in 1 9 7 6 , 7 3 - 5 percent were.

29

Party membership and a distinguished Party career are necessary
criteria for a delegate, but the level of education as a consideration
is rising in importance.

Table 2-9 illustrates the trend toward more

highly educated personnel as Congress delegates.

Between 1961 and 1976,

the percentages of delegates with just an elementary or incomplete
secondary education dropped by seventeen percentage points, while those
with a secondary education or higher increased by nearly that much.
With 90 percent of the delegates having a secondary or higher education,
this lower level Party elite appears to be better educated and probably
more aware than in previous years.
Occupational status of the Congress delegates as described by
Table 2-10 presents a false picture of this characteristic.

Though

members of the worker and peasant classes appear to represent 3 1 -3 per
cent of the total membership in 1 9 7 6 , a ten percentage point increase
from 1 9 7 1 ? only 7 7 percent of the 3 ^ -7 percent were actual workers
while the others were various levels of managers; 28 percent of the
1 7 - 7 percent of peasants were farm directors and collective farm chair-

men.

30

With this clarification and the ^-7-7 percent specified as white

collar workers, it is obvious that in 1 9 7 6 the majority of delegates to

2 9 Ibid., p. 1 1 9 -

30
Current Digest of the Soviet Press, April, 1976, Number 9?

p . 16.

TABLE 2-9

EDUCATION LEVEL OF PARTY CONGRESS DELEGATES

Category
Higher
Incom.
Higher

1961

1 966

1971

52. 5#

55*3%

5 8 .0 %
9 0 .0

5-2
2 *f. 0

Secondary
Incom.
Secondary
or
Elementary

1976

2 7 .0

19.1

2 7 -2

20.5

15.0

1 0 .0

SOURCE: (Table based on data in reports of chairmen of
Credentials Commissions at Party Congresses), as reported in John S.
Reshelar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978),
p. 1 1 8 .
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TABLE 2-10

OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF PARTY CONGRESS DELEGATES

Category

1961

1966

1971

1976

Worker

31.5#

33-0^

24.0$£

34.1^

Peasant

16.9

18.9

17.3

17-7

26.3

2 6 .0

24.3

2 2 .2

10.3
2.3
6.9

1 1 .6
2.7
7-6

1 1 .2
2.3
7.0

White Collar
Party Official
Government
Official
Others
Military
Academic

1 3 .8

3-4
3.4

SOURCE: (Table based on data in reports of chairmen of
Credentials Commissions at Party Congresses), as reported in John S.
Reshelar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978),
p. 1 1 8 .
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the Party Congress represented the white collar stratum of the Party
membership rather than the worker-peasant stratum.

Herbert McCloskey

and John Turner support this discovery by stating in i9 6 0 , in their
book The Soviet Dictatorship,
The Congress
of the Party
leaders from
of the Party

represents the elite rather than a cross section
and is dominated by professional Communist
the executive committees of the several levels
organs.

As is the case in the Supreme Soviet, the Slavic nationality
dominates the Party Congress.

Table 2-11 illustrates Republic repre

sentation in the Congress as compared to its representation in the
1970 census.

The figures show that the RSFSR republic is clearly over

represented while the Ukrainian Republic is underrepresented.

With the

importance of the Ukraine to the agriculture of the country, this may
seem a little surprising.

However, the leaders in Moscow are Russian,

not Ukrainian as under Khrushchev, and this may be the reasoning behind
it.

The Kazakhs and Uzbek are also underpresented, but considering

their locations and foreign cultures, this could be understandable.
The Soviet Union will probably continue to show Russian predominance
in Party organs simply because of their overwhelming position within
the state.

To compare this representation with that of the Supreme

Soviet, one is dealing with nationality groups versus republic groups.
Still, an observation can be made.

The Slavic nationalities have

greater representation in the Party Congress whereas the minorities
have fairer representation in the Supreme Soviet.

With the latter

being the assembly of the state, having its representation often used
as a propaganda tool, this discrepancy can easily be explained.

^Herbert McClosky and John Turner, The Soviet Dictatorship
(New York: McGraw-Hill, i9 6 0 ), p. 297»

TABLE 2-11

REPUBLIC REPRESENTATION IN' THE PARTY CONGRESS

1970 Census
Republic

%

Delegation

%

130,697,000

54.1

3,035

6 0 .7

Ukraine

47,496,000

2 0 .0

894

17.9

Kazakh

1 3 ,0 6 8 ,0 0 0

3.4

21 8

4.4

Uzbek

1 2 ,3 0 5 ,0 0 0

5.1

159

3.2

Beylorussian

9,074,000

lA

CO

•

RSFSR

Population

1976 Party Congress

172

3.4

Azerbaijan

5 ,2 1 9 ,0 0 0

2 .2

96

1-9

Georgia

4,734,000

2 .0

107

2 .1

Moldavian

3 ,6 1 9 ,0 0 0

1-5

44

.9

Lithuania

3 ,1 6 6 ,0 0 0

1.3

49

Kirgiz

3 ,0 0 3 ,0 0 0

1 .2

37

.7

Tadzhik

2 ,9 8 7 ,0 0 0

1 .2

32.

.6

Armenia

2,545,000

1 .1

47

.9

Latvia

2 ,3 8 6 ,0 0 0

1 .0

51

1 .0

Turkman

2 ,2 2 3 ,0 0 0

•9

27

.3

1 .0

SOURCE: (Table based on data in report from chairman of
Credentials Commissions for the 1976 Party Congress), Current Digest of
the Soviet Press, April 9, 1976, p. 16. World Book Encyclopedia,
Vol. 16 (Chicago: Eield Enterprises Educational Corporation, 1977),
p. 494.

38

39
When discussing the age characteristic of delegates, the trend
found for deputies is followed (refer to Table 2-12).
are gradually becoming older.

Congress delegates

Since most of the Party elite are members

of the middle to old age group and foster the careers of older cadres,
often discriminating against younger ones, this trend seems as if it
will continue, possibly pushing the percentage of delegates Over 50 to
nearly one-third.

An interesting note is the sudden increase in younger

delegates for the 1961 Congress.

But, as in the case of deputies to the

Supreme Soviet, this is probably due to the influence of Nikita
Khrushchev and his belief in revitalizing the Party with the young.

How

ever, after his ouster in 1964, the senior elite returned to a more
conservative outlook and the percentages of the Under 40 group eventually
declined, with those of the Over 50 group beginning to increase.
The Soviet politician of the Party Congress is either a Party
official or has distinguished himself as a Party member.

He probably

holds a white collar position and could be classified as a professional.
He is middle aged and educated.

He most likely is of Russian descent

and will only serve for one or two convocations.

He does not feel the

need to question or criticize Party leaders on the issues they present
to the Congress.

The Party Congress endows the Party leadership with a

degree of apparent legitimacy, giving them a vehicle, the delegate,
through which they can relate their policies and programs to the rank
and file members in Party throughout the country.

32

32
John S. Reshetar, Jr., op. cit., p. 119.

TABLE 2-12
AGE OF PARTY CONGRESS DELEGATES

Category

19 6 1

1966

1971

4-0 or under

38.6$

40.2%

31.8#

'+1 - 5 0

37.9

34.3

41.6

Over 50

23*3

25.3

2 6 .6

1976

70.3
2 9 .3

SOURCE: (Table based on data in reports of chairmen of
Credentials Commissions at Party Congresses). As reported in John S.
Reshelar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978),
p. 1 1 8 .
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Summary
The Soviet politicians for both bodies can be considered, at
the least, members of the lower stratum of elites.

3^

For the most part,

they are educated and have achieved some form of recognition, either
for their Party or for the state.

They are more than likely of middle

age and may be Slavic, though in the Supreme Soviet, their nationality
may be from a minority group.

They probably hold white collar position

for though the Supreme Soviet shows near equality between workerpeasant status and white collar status, the Party Congress is definitely
a white collar organization.

Between the two organizations, the Supreme

Soviet is more representative in minority and worker-peasant representa
tion.

The older generation predominance in the Supreme Soviet possibly

illustrates the higher importance that the Party elite puts on deputy
status rather than delegate status.

The great Soviet myth of the lowly

proletarian rising to participation in his state government on his Party
is only slightly supported by this chapter.

33The reason that the phrase 'at least1 was used was that some
members of both the Supreme Soviet and the Party Congress are also
members of the Central Committee, Council of Ministers, or even Polit
buro. If they do hold that type of membership, then they are considered
members of the upper or top stratum of elites.

CHAPTER III

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS/CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU
The major purposes of the Council of Ministers and the Central
Committee of the CPSU— administering and controlling the vast bureau
cracies of their respective areas— indicate basic similarities between
these two very different organizations.

Though each is declared to be

an actual seat of power, in practice each is only an executor, with
little initiative power.

Their memberships, however, are considered

the upper political elite of Soviet society and enjoy the privileges
and status that accompanies this designation.

The comparative resem

blance between the functions and membership of these organizations has
suggested the discussion of both in the same chapter.
Further similarities between the two involve size and position in
their respective hierarchies.

Though the institutions themselves vary

greatly in size, the percentages of their size to those of their respec
tive assemblies are comparable (see Table 3-1)•

With but a 1.2 percentage

point difference in their proportional percentages, it can be stated that
these two organizations are of equivalent size in proportion to their
respective assemblies.

As to placement in the structure of their respec

tive hierarchies, both organizations are subordinate to an assembly yet
accountable to a Presidium (see Appendix A).

Though the Council of

Ministers is positionally equal to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet,
it is constitutionally accountable and responsible to the Supreme Soviet

b2

TABLE 3-1
COMPARATIVE MEMBERSHIP FIGURES FOR THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU

Organization

1976 Membership

Council of Ministers

Percentage

111

Supreme Soviet (197*0

1,917

7-3

k2 6

Central Committee
Party Congress (1976)

*f,998

8-5

SOURCE: John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York:
Harper & Row, 197$), pp. 117, ll8, 179* "Chiefs of State and Cabinet
Members of Foreign Governments", C.I.A. R ference Aid, 1977, pp. 69-71.

4-3
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and between sessions, to its Presidium.^- The Central Committee, by
Party Statutes, is responsible and accountable to the Party Congress,
but in practice, to the Politburo.

The Council of Ministers and the

Central Committee share several characteristics which make them com
parable organizations.

The Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers, according to the 1977 Constitution,
is the 'highest executive and administrative organ of the state
authority'.

2

According to a Soviet source, it oversees the enormous

state bureaucracy, supervises the development of the budget and all
monetary matters, administers all Party and state policies in foreign
and domestic areas, and controls a substantial part of the activities
of the bureaucracies of the union republics.''

It can also issue decrees

and orders which are binding throughout the Soviet Union.

Its membership

consists of a Chairman, two First Deputy Chairmen, eleven Deputy Chair
men, and numerous ministers and chairmen of State Committees.

The chair

men of the Council of Ministers of each union republic also merit member
ship.

Members are selected by the nomenklatura of the Council of

Ministers and 'elected' by the Supreme Soviet at the first session of
*
each new convocation.
*
Convocation is a word used to designate the assembling of the
Supreme Soviet.
■^Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation), Pennsylvania State University, 1972, pp. 200-201.
2

John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York:
Row, 1978), p. 190.
3

Harper 8c

G. Moiseyev and A. Ardatovsky, Political Democracy in theUSSR
(London: Soviet Booklets, 1 9 6 9 )? p. 1.

The evidence of Communist Party control of this body comes
through an analysis of its membership.

First, currently and similarly

in the past, six full members and two candidate members of the Polit
buro hold positions in the Council of Ministers, including the second
most powerful man in the Soviet Union, Alexis Kosygin.

His position

as Chairman of this organization gives him the title of Premier of the
Soviet Union.

Central Committee membership by government ministers

further illustrates Party domination.
1968 Council as an example.
on the Central Committee.

Table 3-2 uses a sample of the
*
In 1976, sixty-six Council members sat

This overlapping of membership continues to

support the assertion of Communist Party power over the governmental
apparatus of the Soviet Union.
Data on the characteristics of members of this state body is
very difficult to obtain.

Research on the Communist Party, its organi

zations and its membership is more prevalent in Soviet studies.

However,

one study has been found that gives various statistical information
which seems to generally describe the type of individual who might
achieve membership in the Council of Ministers.

This study is "The

Education of the Soviet Party Executive" by Renee Grace Loeffler.

She

uses classifications of Party Executives, Government Executives, and
Economic Executives.

The latter two will be used as typifying the

candidate for an All Union minister position or state committee chair
manship.

The first category will be used for comparison purposes.

Table 3-3 sets forth her definitions of these categories.

Whereas her

statistics include characteristics of both All Union and republic level
*
The figure sixty-six was derived by information in Tables 3-10
and 3-11•

TABLE > 2

MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IN THE, CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU FOR TEE YEAR 1968 (A SAMPLE)

Percent on Central Committee
of Each Category

Category
Chr., Deputy Chr., and Ministers

96%

Chr. of State Committees

8 l%

Chr. of Republic Council of Ministers

100 %

SOURCE: George Fischer, The Soviet System and Modern Society,
(New York: Atherton Press, 1 9 6 8 ), p. 121.

kG

TABLE 3-3

GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC EXECUTIVES (DEFINITIONS)

Year - 1962

Groups

Number in Sample
1.

USSR Council of Ministers Chairman. First
Deputy Chairmen, Deputy Chairmen

3

2.

USSR Ministers

9

3-

USSR State Committee Chairmen, Gosplan
Chairman or Deputy Chairman

23

4.

Republic Council of Ministers Chairmen

8

3.

Republic Gosplan Chairmen, Sovnarkhoz
Chairmen

6.

21

Republic Capitol City Executive Committee
Chairmen

4

7-

Province Executive Committee Chairmen

46

8.

Province Sovnarkohoz Chairmen

26

Total

ibO
(in one sample used)

Government Executives - 1, 4, 6 and 7
Economic Executives

- 3i 5, 8

USSR ministers were divided between the two categories according
to the nature of the particular ministry.
Party Executives refer to representatives of Party Officials from
Province level to All Union level.

SOURCE: Renee Grace Loeffler, ’’The Education of the Soviet
Party Elite” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation), Cornell University,
1975), p. 48.
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48
state officials, about 26 percent of the figure for Government
Executive and 33 percent of the figure for Economic Executives repre
sent All Union level.

Though these percentages are rather small, the

statistics do describe the sample from which the members of the Council
of Ministers are usually drawn.
The statistics used for this section are for the year 1962.
Though that dates them by sixteen years, they can still serve as an
indicator of the type of individual who may achieve membership in this
state elite group.

The major reason for this comes from the low turn

over rate for the Council of Ministers (see Table 3-4).
and 1977» this rate was only 33 percent.

Between 1 9 6 8

In contrast to the Supreme

Soviet membership or even the Politburo membership, the Council of
Ministers represents a relatively stable, unchanging organization.

The

type of individual who might become a member could as well be described
by Ms. Loeffler's statistics as by more recent information.
The statistics on education illustrate the importance placed on
this area in choosing a member of the Council of Ministers, as well as
the skill and intelligence possessed by these individuals.

Table 3-3

shows the tremendous advantage of Economic Executives in the area of
higher learning, and for them, the unimportance of any type of Party
School.

The Table also demonstrates the emphasis of education for all

Soviet Executives, with over 60 percent in each category having com
pleted college or college and Party School.
with Table 3-6.

Intelligence comes into view

If early graduation is associated with higher intelli

gence, then the Government Executive has a definite advantage in ability.
Without this assumption, it can still be hypothesized that members of the
executive group in the Soviet Union begin their careers at an early age

TABLE 3-k

TURNOVER RATE OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Number of Ministers
in Positions in 1971

Category
Chairman and First
Deputy Chr.

Number of Positions
Net Held by Same Men
in 1 968

3

0

Deputy Chairmen

11

k

USSR Ministers

62

16

State Comm.' Chr.

19

10

Chr. of Rep. Council
of Ministers

13

9

11 0

39

Total

(Six Minister positions in 1 9 7 7 were not in existence in 1 9 6 8 )
Percent of turnover between 1977 and 1968 - 35%
SOURCE: "Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign
Governments", CIA Reference Aid, 1877? pp« 69-71* USSR, A Strategic
Survey, 1969 (Washington, B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
I9 6 9 )? P- 185? Appendix C.

^9

TABLE 3-5
LEVEL OF EDUCATION FOR 19 6 2
FOR SOVIET EXECUTIVES
Percent of Total with that Level
Category

Party

Government

Economic

No Higher Education

11#

15%

5%

Party School Only

27

20

2

College

48

56

91

College and Party School

14

9

2

SOURCE: Renee Grace Loeffler, "The Education of the Soviet
Party Elite" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1975)?
p. 63-
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TABLE 3-6

AGE OF COLLEGE GRADUATION*

Age

Party
Executive

22 or less

17%

26 %

00
H

Government
Executive

Economic
Executive

23 to 25

30

23

32

2 6 to 3 0

27

18

22

Over 30

13

12

9

Unknown

12

21

19

*
In many cases the biographical sources did not give the exact
time of college graduation, and therefore, certain assumptions were
made in coding this question. Specifically, if an executive had a
higher education; there was no specific information about when he com
pleted college; he took his first known job in his early twenties; the
job was of the sort that usually required a higher education; then it
was assumed, if there was no indication to the contrary, then he gradu
ated immediately before assuming his first job. Because of these
assumptions, the da.ta on age of college graduation is relatively soft.

SOURCE: Renee Grace Loeffler, ’’The Education of the Soviet
Party Elite” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1975)i
p. 75-
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since over 5 0 percent of them had completed college by the time they
became twenty-five years old.
tion of these executives.

Table 3-7 shows the area of concentra

Though the emphasis for engineers and

agronomists is clearly evident among the Soviet executives, the
extremely large number of engineers among the Economic Executives
points to a purposeful technocratic influence on Soviet economics, an
innovation which can be traced to Nikita Khrushchev.

The upper

political elite in the state hierarchy appear to be highly educated,
intelligent, and technically skilled.
The validity of the above conclusion, however, could be ques
tioned.

Though the existence of degrees, especially in agronomy and

engineering is very high among Soviet executives, the competence in
these areas may not be high.

Robert Kaiser in his book Russia describes

this phenomenon in the following words:
Some Soviet officials, the unqualified carreerists . . .
simply too stupid to be condemned, dull-witted, auto
matically selfish people to whom moral or even intellectural considerations were alien. Because merit alone is
often insufficient to earn advancement, the best people
often do not rise to the top. Many of the worst people
get there.^
Fedor Fanfero in his novel Volga-Matushaka Reka also illustrates
how 'the worst people get there1.

Though his novel is dated, his

example is illustrative of what presently could occur in Soviet society.
Semen Malinov was a student at the Bauman Institute, one
of the finest engineering schools in the Soviet Union, and
he was subsequently to become an obkom first secretary.
Semen had one main gift— the ability to speak and to imitate.
Thanks to such oratorical gifts, Semen Malinov was ’loaded1
and ’overloaded' with assignments: he was one of the
Komsomol leaders in the Institute, the chairman of the civil

Robert Kaiser, Russia (New York:

Atheneuin, 1976), p. 195-

TABLE 3-7
TYPE OP HIGHER EDUCATION

Party
Executive

Government
Executive

Economic
Executive

No Higher Ed.

11 #

15%

5%

Party School Only

27

20

2

Engineering

26

22

83

Agronomy

18

2b

2

Others

18

19

8

Category

SOURCE: Renee Grace Loeffler, ’’The Education of the Soviet
Party Elite” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1973)?
p. 65.
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defense unit, in the Aid to the Revolutionaries Society,
and even in the sports circle • • • * And science?
Science remained somewhere at the side. He did not drag
himself to the books and he listened to lectures according
to the proverb:
'In one ear and out the other.* But it
was necessary to pass the exams, and Semen Malinov un
willingly had to resort to the method of 'dodging. 1 To
some teachers he gave his honored word:
'I'll hand it
in! I'll hand it in! Word of honor, I'll hand it in!
Just give me a grade now . . . I will get it to you.'
To others who were a little sterner, he answered the
questions with patter, impudently looking into their
eyes. When he did not hit the point, he began to com
plain about being swamped with work. The 'stern'
professor would yield, saying 'Yes, yes, I know. I know.
I ’ve seen your picture in the Konsomol newspaper . . . .'
And he wrote on the grade sheet 'Passes.' With such
dodges Malinov left the institute, having received the
diploma of an engineer but not the knowledge of on e . 5
The position of a member of the Council of Ministers does
require skill and ability, but with the patronage system and tactics
used in Soviet politics as described in Chapter V, the possibility that
these characteristics lie in a non-technical area exists.
The social orgins of the state executives present an insight
into Soviet politics.

It must be understood that these origins are

the classes in which the executive was born and may not correspond to
his present social class (see Table 3~8).

(The "unknown" category, in

the analysis, will be grouped with the white collar group, for Ms.
Loeffler indicated in her dissertation the tendency of Soviet biographer
to leave out social origin if it refers to a white collar classification
Though not always true, it occurs often enough to justify grouping the
two together.)
For Party and Government Executives, peasant class origins
predominate.

Two basic reasons can explain this.

The first concerns

5
Jerry Hough, The Soviet Prefects (Cambridge, Mass.:
University Press, 1969 )» P* 363, quoted from n. 1 1 .

Harvard

TABLE 3-8
CLASS ORIGINS OF EXECUTIVES

Classification

Peasant
White Collar
Unknown

Economic
Executive

oo
OJ

Worker

Government
Executive .

Party
Executive

21%

33%

^7

51

23

6

k

11

19

2k

33

SOURCE: Renee Grace Loeffler, "The Education of the Soviet
Party Elite” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 197D)?
p. 163-
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the age of these men.

Though statistics on this characteristics are

unavailable for members of the Council of Ministers,with most of the
members sitting in the Central Committee (refer to Table 3-2) and the
majority of Central Committee members over fifty (refer to Table 3-16
and 3-17), then it can be assumed that the majority of the Soviet state
executives are over fifty.

With this clarification and considering the

social classes in the Soviet Union at the time of these men’s birth,
the large

representation of peasantry does not seem unusual. Also,

Economic Executive needs

specialized training.

an

This was not usually

available

to the average peasant in the Soviet Union at that time,

therefore

they opted for Party or Government careers.

The figures for the Economic Executives show a different picture.
This group’s strength is in both the worker and white collar group, if
the latter is combined with the ’’unknown” group.
representation can be explained in two ways.

The large worker

First, as in the previous

situation, the era in which these men were born might dictate such a
representation.

Second, with an Economic Executive needing precise

technical skills and the government offering numerous scholarships to
the technical institutes, the possibility of easier access to these by
the worker group exists.
explanation.

White collar representation offers another

Economic careers in the Soviet Union mean stability and

less restrictions on personal life than do Party careers.
for their popularity in the white collar group.

This accounts

With the children of

successful people inheriting their parents' status, though not political
power and assured of the opportunity of admission into the best schools

51

(see Chapter V), a self-perpetuating aspect of this career, type in the
white collar group appears.^
Currently, All Union state officials are members of the upper
stratum of Soviet society; however, by analyzing their class origins,
career patterns and opportunities among the classes can be implied.
The similarity between the origins of the Government and Party Execu
tives could be explained by the fact that most Government Executives
are drawn from the Party Executive ranks and that a Party career has
been very attractive for members of the lower classes.

Summing up the

characteristics already discussed, there seems to be a link between
education, technical skill, and social origin in the elites of the
state apparatus in the Soviet Union.
The Council of Ministers, though a body to resolve bureaucratic
problems of all the republics, seems to be dominated by the people of
one nationality group, the Russians.

Table 3~9 gives statistics for

the year 1 9 6 2 for the sample in Ms. Loeffler's statistics.

If the

92 percent figure of Russian nationality representation is compared
with the 5k percent figure of Russian nationality representation in the
total population of 1999 (refer to Table 2-6), the gross overepresenta
tion of the Russian nationality in Ms. Loeffler's sample of the Council
of Ministers is apparent.

(It can be assumed that her sample is repre

sentative for the organization at that time.)

An interesting aspect of

this is that in 1 9 6 2 , Nikita Khrushchev, a Ukrainian was the Chairman of
the Council of Ministers yet, his Council appears to have been over
represented by Russians!

If this representation is compared to the

Robert Kaiser, op. cit., p. l8 l.

TABLE 3-9

DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONALITY GROUPINGS AMONG EXECUTIVES
.

Posts on the USSR Level
for the year 1962

Category

32%

Russians
More Developed

k

Less Developed

k

Economically More Developed include: Armenian, Georgian,
Estonian, Latvian, and Ukrainian.
*j^
Economically Less Developed include: Azerbaidzhan, Kazakh,
Kirgiz, Tadzhik, Turkmen, Uzbek, Lithuanian, Belorussian, and
Moldavian.

SOURCE: George Fischer, The Soviet System and Modern Society,
(New York: Atherton Press, 1 9 6 8 ), pp. ?4-75*
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Russian representation in the Supreme Soviet in 1 9 6 2 (see Table 2-6), a
large inconsistency exists.
lity accounted for only

Supreme Soviet deputies of Russian nationa
percent of its membership at that time.

However, with the Supreme Soviet being the Soviet ’parliament’, the
Council of Ministers, being the Soviet state ’executive’ and the
Russian nationality the largest, plus most dominant in the nation, this
discrepancy could possibly be explained.
The typical Soviet- politician of the Council of Ministers is
a technical skilled and educated individual of some intelligence, with
a lower class origin.

He is of middle age, a professional, and pro

bably a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
is most likely Russian.

His nationality

Whereas he may have secured his position for

reasons other than competence, he probably displays some skill in the
area of his position.

The appeal for careers in the state apparatus

may origins.te more from its security and less restrictive life than
from a deep commitment to the Soviet state and the ideological goals
of communism.
The Central Committee of the CPSU
Originally, the Politburo of the CPSU was to be a branch of the
more powerful Central Committee.

However, as the size of the latter

increased (see Table 3-10),the purposes of the two bodies were reversed,
7

and the Central Committee became an instrument of the Politburo.
*
Lenin attributed this transformation to infrequent plenary sessions
*
Plenary is the word referring to a full sitting of the Central
Committee.
7

Wasyl Kalyncwvch, ’’The Top Elite of the Communist Party of the
USSR” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1972), p. 108.

TABLE > 1 0

NUMERICAL GROWTH OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Year

Full Members

Candidate Members

1917

9

4

1919

19

8

1921

23

13

1923

40

17

1923

63

43

1927

71

30

1934

71

68

1932

123

111

1936

133

122

1961

173

133

1966

193

163

1971

241

133

1976

287

139

SOURCE: Wasyl Kalynowych, "The Top Elite of the Communist
Party of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University,
1 9 7 2 ), p. 1 1 1 .
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and the daily decision-making functions of the Politburo and
Secretariat.

8 In 1923 Lenin stated,

The plenum of the Central Committee of our Party has already
disclosed its tendency to develop into a sort of Party con
ference. It meets on the average of no less than once in
two months, and the current work in the name of the Central
Committee is carried on by our Politburo . . . .
I think
that we should complete this path on which we have entered
and convert the plenums of the Central Committee into higher
Party conferences.9
Following this direction, the Central Committee has evolved into the
second level of the Party leadership, the overseer of the Central Party
apparatus, and a depository from which Politburo members are chosen.^
According to Soviet sources, the Central Committee directs all
Party activities and bodies between sessions of the Party Congress,
appoints Party officials, organizes and manages enterprises which have
general Party character, and manages all Central Party funds.^

In

practice, it has become a strictly planned forum which is used by the
top Party elite for purposes of informing Central Committee members of
and promoting new Party policies.

It could be classified as a ’rubber

stamp' organization for the passage of Party resolutions.

Topics dis

cussed at the plenums range from economics to ideology to reorganization.
Speeches can last from one to eight or more hours.
Despite the facade of policy-making or decision-making power, the
Central Committee does oversee a large bureaucracy, the Central Party
o
Ibid., p. 118.
9 Ibid., p. 1 1 9 .

*^Roy D. Laird, The Soviet Paradigm (New York:
1970), p. 1 0 1 .
asyl Kalynowych, op. cit., p. 107-

The Free Press,
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Apparatus.

This consists of 900 staff workers assisted by 2400 other

personnel, plus several in-house Party organizations and their
respective staffs.

12

Though it does not initiate any policy, m

rare

instances it has been known to mediate disputes or deadlocks among the
top Party leaders.
of a leader.

It also has exercised power in regard to the fate

In 1957? though voted out as leader by the members of the

Politburo, Nikita Khrushchev was able to retain his position by an
affirmative vote of the Central Committee. 13

Though the actual power

of the Central Committee varies, its high status in the Soviet Union
is always prevalent.
Membership in the Central Committee consists of upper Party and
government political elites (see Table 3-11)•

Membership is secured as

a function of one of the following:
1.
2.
34.
5»

power - member of the top elite such as the Politburo or its
Secretariat
position - position in government or Party merits membership
representation - nationality and social representation
specialization - holders of specially needed skills or
experts
symbo3.ic - special persons such as cosmonauts

Final decisions as to membership belong to the Party elite and the core
elite (see Table 3-19) of the Committee.

The perceptions of the top

leadership as to the personnel and recruitment needs of the Committee
becomes a most important imput in the decisions on membership.

15

A

12

A. Pravdin, ’’Inside the CPSU Central Committee” , Survey,
(Autumn, 197^)? p- 96.
13

Thomas H. Rigby, ’’How Strong is the Leader”, Problems of
Communism (September-October, 1962), pp. 4-6.
^Joseph P. Mastro, ’’The Soviet Political Elite" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 50.
1<5Ibid.

TABLE 3-11
MAJOR CATEGORIES IN VOTING MEMBERSHIP
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Year

1 966

1971

1976

Oblast and Irai Sec.

2 3 .0 $

2 *f.O#

28.9#

USSR Govt. Ministers

1.8.9#

2 2 .A#

2 3 .0 #

Union Rep. Cen.
Com. Sec. ,

9.8#

8 .0 #

6 .6 #

CPSU Cen. Comm. Sec.,
and Dept. Heads

6 .6 #

5.8#

3.2#

Union Rep. Prem. and
Dep. Prem.

h . 6%

3-3#

3.8#

Military

7.8#

8 .0 #

7.0#

Other categories include:
City Committee Secretaries
Secretaries of Autonomous Republics Party Committees
Aides to CPSU General Secretary

SOURCE: John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York:
Harper & Row, 1978), p. !
121.
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revealing aspect about Central Committee membership is the trends in
recruitment as indicated in Table 3-11-

Between 1 9 6 6 and 1976,

provincial secretary representation increased by 3 * 9 percentage points
and government minister membership by k*l percentage points.

Republic

and AID. Union Party representation, much smaller originally, decreased
by 3*2 and 1.^ percentage points, respectively.

This implies the

importance of provincial status in ones career growth and the prefer
ence for these people over the more sophisticated though possibly not
as trustworthy Central Party or regional Party personnel for Central
Committee membership.

From Table 3-11? it can also be assumed that

greater importance has been recently placed on elite government posi
tions in Party organizations, than in previous years.

Formally, the

Committee is elected at the penultimate session of the Party Congress
with a secret ballot; but the list on the ballot never exceeds the
number of seats in the Committee.

l6

Since top government and Party

elite make up 8 l.l percent of the membership of the Central Committee,
1*7
(they make up only 2.1 percent of the total Party membership),
the

Central Committee of the CPSU can legitimately be described as a body
wherein the upper political elite of the Soviet Union can be found.
The growth in the level of educational training for Central
Committee members was emphasized in the following words by Leonid
Brezhenv in 1971:

■^John S. Reshetar, Jr., op. cit., p. 112.
17Boris Meissner, "Totalitarian Rule and Social Change",
Problems of Communism (December, 1 9 6 6 ), p. 39*
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Life is making continuously greater demands on cadres. We
need people who combine a high level of political conscious
ness with a sound professional training, people who can
knowledgeably tackle the problems of economic and cultural
development and are well-versed in modern methods of manage
ment •
As Table 3-12 shows, the 1960's brought an increase in the
level of education of members in the Central Committee.
words indicate this trend is continuing.

Brezhnev's

The Table also shows a tend-

ency to coopt persons in a specialized field of higher education. 19
The impetus for both of these aspects could be attributed to
Nikita Khrushchev and his belief in the need for recruitment of techno
crats in the Party hierarchical positions.

The substantial drop in

those with only Party School training implies the growing emphasis on
formal and technical education and the de-emphasizing of the more
ideologically oriented members or less educated personnel.

This

importance on education and specialized training has transformed the
Central Committee into a highly trained and specialized group.

In

choosing membership in the future, it seems assured that educational
level and technical training will probably become deciding factors.
Occupational representation indicates the dominance of the
white collar stratum of Soviet society in the membership of the Central
Committee (see Table 3-13)•

While Party Apparatus members show a

slight decline in membership, state personnel show an increase.

This

is similar to the evidence presented in Table 3-11 which described some
ilS

Joseph P. Mastro, op. cit., p. 2?8.
19Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride, "The Soviet Central
Committee: An Elite Analysis", The American Political Science Review
(December, 1 9 6 8 ), p. 1233-

TABLE 3-12
LEVEL AND TYPE OF EDUCATION OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Category

1961

1966

7b%

8 2 .6 ^

Military

-

8 .1

University

-

9-3

Technical

-

6 3 .2

Party School only

10

4.4

Incomplete College

8

-

Secondary

4

2 .2

4

•3

College

Less than Secondary

SOURCE: Yaroslav Bilinsky, Changes in Central Committee
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1961-1966 (Denver: University of
Denver, 1 9 6 7 )1 p* 46. Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride, "The
Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis", American Political
Science Review (December, 1 9 6 8 ), p. 1233-
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TABLE 3-13
OCCUPATIONAL GROUP REPRESENTATION IN THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE IN 1961 AND 1966

Category

1961

State and Economic Officials

00
-4-

Party Apparatus

1966

h3%

34

38

Military

9-3

9-7

Culture and Science

3.4

4.2

Police

-

Workers and Peasants

-

2 .8

Others

3-3

2 .3

SOURCE: Wasyl Kalynowych, ’’The Top Elite of the Communist Party
of the USSR’’ (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1972)?
p. 126.
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of the membership groups in the Committee.

The three main categories

in Table 3-13 show a general range of percentages for these types of
membership.

This could support the claim that recruitment of Central

Committee membership is based upon function areas and the perception
of needs for membership by the leadership.

The low representation of

workers and peasants further verifies the assertion that the Central
Committee is an elite element in the Communist Party apparatus.
The nationality representation in the Central Committee is
similar to representation in the other political bodies discussed (see
Table 3-14).

The Slavic group controls.

1961 for the Russian representation was

Whereas the representation in
43 percent in the Supreme Soviet

and around 80-90 percent

in the Council of Ministers, it was 3 8 percent

in the Central Committee

indicating, as inthe others, its dominance of

the Committee.

in most of the other bodies, this nationality

Also, as

group is overrepresented, but as mentioned previously, with the import
ance of this group of people to the Soviet Union, this aspect does not
seem unusual.

In deciding upon new members (see Table 3-13)1 there

appears to be a preference for representation from the Russian national
ity.

The power of the top Party elite in the decision-making process of

choosing new members for the Central Committee insures the dominance of
whichever nationality group it prefers.
Age represents a further insight into the membership of the
Central Committee.

In referring to Table 3-16, the trend toward an

older membership is apparent.

In 1936, 46.61 percent were 50 years or

older; in 1961, 62.29 percent were; in 1 9 6 6 , 78.47 percent were.

The

dominance of the older generation in the Committee is further illustrated
by Table 3-17 which illustrates the change in the average age and median

TABLE 3-3.k
NATIONALITY REPRESENTATION III THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Nationality

1961 - %

1966 - %

Russians

38-29

^7-93

Ukranians

2 0 .0 0

1 8 .k 6

Belorussians

3-^3

3-13

Uzbeks

2.29

1.3^

Kazakhs

1 .1 ^+

2 .0 3

Georgians

l.l*f

1.03

Azerbaijanis

.37

.31

Lithuanians

.37

•31

Moldavians

.37

.31

Latvians

l.l*f

1-3^

Kirghiz

.37

.31

Tadzhiks

.37

.31

1.71

1.3^

Turkmens

.37

.31

Estonians

.37

.31

Finns

.37

-

Jews

.37

.31

Bashkirs

.37

.31

Tartars

.37

.31

Armenians

SOURCE: Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Ruler and the Ruled", Problems
of Communism, 1963? as illustrated in Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme
Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State
University, 1972)', p. 38^.

69

TABLE. 3-15
NATIONALITY OF NEW MEMBERS

I9 6 I ~ %

1966 - %

Russians

62.9

67.03

Ukrainians

16.13

13.38

Beloruss ians

3.23

1 .1 0

Uzbeks

2.42

.0

Kazaks

00 00
• •

H

.0

H

1 .1 0

Armenians

1 .6 1

2 .2 0

Georgians

.0

1 .1 0

Moldavians

00
•

.0

Tadzkiks

.8 1

1 .1 0

Kirgiz

00
•

.0

Latvians

.0

1 .1 0

Estonians

•
00

Nationality

1 .1 0

4.03

.0

Azerbaidzhanians

H
H

H

Others

SOURCE: Joseph P. Mastro, ”The Soviet Political Elite”
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972)5
p. 79-
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TABLE 3-16

AGE OF FULL MEMBERS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Age

1956 - %

1961 - %

1966 -%

To 35

0

2 .8 6

1.03

36-40

3 .0 1

1.71

2.56

41-45

9-77

12.57

3 .0 8

46-50

38.35

20.57

14.87

51-55

2.8.57

32.57

26.67

5 6 -6 0

9.77

2 0 .0

3 0 .2 6

6 1 -6 5

5 .2 6

6.29

13.85

Over 66

3 -0 1

3-43

7-69

SOURCE: Joseph P. Mastro, "The Soviet Political Elite"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972),
p. 1 2 2 .
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TABLE 3-17

AVERAGE AND MEDIAN AGE IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE

1956

1961

1966

Average

51

52

56

Median

^6 - 5 0

51-55

5 6 -6 0

Year

1976

SOURCE: Joseph P. Mastro, "The Soviet Political Elite" (un
published Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972),
p. 125 • Jerry F. Hough, "The Brezhnev Era", Problems of Communism
(April, 1976), p. h.
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age within a twenty year period.

With the turnover rate of the older

top Party elite being very low and the turnover rate of Central
Committee membership low (in 1971» 63-9 percent of the 1966 Committee
were re-elected, and in 1976, 89 percent of the 1971 Committee
were),

20

the dominance of the older generation over this body seems

assured for at least the next five years.
Achieving Central Committee membership is not an easy task.
Twenty years has been the usual apprenticeship period before becoming
a member.
five years.

In 19711 for new members, the period extended to twenty21

With the age of entrance into the Party increasing, the

age at which future generations will be able to achieve membership will
be at least forty-five years.

To further support the continuation of

this generational control, new members that are chosen are similar,
statistically, to the demoted or deceased member.

As an example, if a

Central Committee member who had joined the Party in 1932-3^- at the age
of twenty-six would leave, he would be replaced by one who joined the
Party between 1930 and 19^1 at the age of twenty-six; the longer the
doors are closed to post Stalin elite, the greater the possibility of
a generational conflict among the Party elite.

22

The existence of a Slavic core elite within the Central Committee
hints to where the real power lies (refer to Appendix C).
controlled the Committee from 1936-1971-

This group

They were members who had

served on the Committee for at least four terms.

Of the group serving

20Jerry Hough, "The Brezhnev Era", Problems of Communism
(April, 1976), p. 4.
21
Joseph P. Mastro, op. cit., p. 292.
22Ibid., p. 278.

four terms, 88 percent

ere of Slavic nationality and 30 percent had

served in five Committees or more.

In 19711 the Slavic core lost its

tight grip on this group as other nationality groups were able to break
into its ranks.

Its representation dropped to 8 l percent as the number

in the core elite enlarged.
occurrence.

Several speculations can be made from that

The leadership may have desired more communication and

linkage with local populations.

They may have employed this tactic in

an attempt to foster a feeling in the population that they do have a
stake in the system and an impact on decision-making; finally, they may
have used it as an illustration of the participation mechanisms in
existence in the Soviet political system. ^
In the Soviet Union, members of the Central Committee possess
an immense amount of power, prestige and are immuned to public criticism
by the general population.

2k

They not only have been known to abuse

their status, but at times, have even been known to be fraudulent and
manipulative.

Though this topic will be further investigated in

Chapter V, the following illustration shows the possible nature of one
who has achieved Central Committee rank:
When they were choosing a director for the Moscow Institute
of Sociology, the name of one Grigorii Kvasov was put for
ward • • • • He was quite unknown in science and a man of
no principles, but he happened to be an instructor of the
Central Committee and was interested in the position. (An
*
instructor has a status equal to that of a raikom secretary
in the capital.) When Kvasov was an aspirant (MA candidate)
at Mowcow University in 1963? he began to spread the rumor
just before defending his dissertation, that he was a distant
relative of Brezhnev. He supposed, not without reason, that
this item of information would help him get the dissertation
*
Raikom translates district.
2 5 Ibid., p. 1 0 7 2k

A. Pravdin, op. cit., p. 101.
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through. Of course, there was no truth in it, but some
people believed him, because both Kvasov and Brezhnev were
from Moldavia- The rumor, in any case, reached the Central
Committee, Kvasov was called in (with his degree in his
pocket) and warned that he should not encourage such rumors,
Kvasov, who was frightened, tried to claim that he had a
distant aunt who either knew Brezhnev’s wife's sister, or
was somehow related to her. The people of the CC decided
to bring the matter to Brezhnev's notice, Brezhnev was
indignant . * . but then said; he wanted to see the imposter.
The impudent Kvasov, though by now scared to death, managed
to produce a favorable impression on Brezhnev. So that
they gave him a job in the Department of Philosophy of the
CC. The strange thing was that in the CC, Kvasov's real
history was soon forgotten, and the story that he was a
relative of Brezhnev began to circulate again !^5
Another tactic of Central Committee members is sophistry.

If

for some reason they are not ardent Marxists, but work v/ith others
who are, they must have the ability to produce a well argued lie.

26

Dishonesty often becomes a way of life for these members as well as
for other Soviet political elite as will be discussed in Chapter V.
This even extends to acquiring unearned degrees.

The portrait of an

intensely devoted Marxist who has dedicated himself to the Party and
the state is often not an accurate description of the members of this
elite Party organ.
Achievement of Central Committee membership designates one as
a member of the Soviet upper political elite.

With subjectivity as

well as functionality playing a role in the selection of new members,
the membership in the Committee is tightly controlled.

The average

member is over 50' years old with a high level of education.

He is of

Slavic origin and has been a Party member for at least twenty years.

2 ^Ibid., p. 1 0 0 .

26
Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride, op. cit., p. 12*f0.
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His professional position lies either in the Party or State apparatus
which places him in the upper stratum of Soviet society.
likely a veteran of one or two Committees.

He is most

In aggregate terms, the

Central Committees of the past decade were more skilled and better
educated than their predecessors; in all probability this shift could
be attributed to the recognized need for more specialists in elite
Party positions, resulting from the changed nature of the Soviet
political system in the recent years.

2 7

Summary
The members of the Council of Ministers and Central Committee are
regarded as the upper political elite in Soviet society.

They are highly

educated, especially in the technical areas, though it is possible that
some degrees were not earned honestly.
Russian nationality.

They are dominantly of the

They are members of the older generation and the

trends indicate that this will continue.

They are both groups of pro

fessionals, the Council of Ministers by mere fact of their positions in
the state hierarchy and the Centra]. Committee through occupational repre
sentation.

In neither group is there presently much worker or peasant

representation, though the social origins of many members of the Council
of Ministers lie in these classes.

Members of these political organi

zations enjoy status, power, privileges, and similar rank in Soviet
society, making these bodies ones in which membership is highly sought.

27

Joseph Mastro, op. cit., p. 183.

CHAPTER IV

PRESIDIUMS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND SUPREME
SOVIET/POLITBURO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTI
The Presidiums of the Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet
and the Politburo of the CPSU, the highest political institutions in
the Soviet Union, have positional similarity within their respective
hierarchies, each holds status and rank above a larger assembly (see
Appendix A).

However, power is distributed unevenly among these

elite organizations, making resemblance emanate from only the struc
tural positions of all three, not from the disbursement of power.
Membership, though, in each, is highly selective and controlled.
Members are considered to be the upper to top political elite in the
Soviet political system.'**

Since these organizations are structurally

comparable, the discussion of them in the same chapter seems justified.

Presidiums of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers
Being organizations of the state, the Presidiums of both the
Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers, in practice, lack in major
decision-making power.

Their power and influence come from the over

lapping membership of their personnel in the Politburo of the CPSU and
Central Committee, including their respective chairmen.

These are two

**This holds true for all members in the Politburo and the
Presidium of the Council of Ministers, but with the diverse membership
in the Presidium of the Supreme as illustrated in Table k- 2, it might
not be true of all of its members.
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top men in the Soviet political system and their presence on these
Presidiums contributes to these bodies' high regard in Soviet
politics.

Leonid Brezhnev, Politburo member and the General Secre

tary of the Communist Party, is presently the Chairman of the Presi
dium of the Supreme Soviet.

With the revisions of the 1977 Constitu

tion, this position carries all chief of state functions and is
designated by the title, President of the Soviet Union.

Alexis

Kosygin, Politburo member, is the Chairman of the Presidium of the
Council of Ministers which carries the title, Premier of the Soviet
Union.

Party elite officials, so intertwined in the state apparatus,

continue to demonstrate the dominance and control of the Party over
all state affairs.
To understand further these execut5.ve organs, a discussion of
their functions and a description of their membership will be presented.
Statistical data on their personnel is not obtainable.

Since in actual

practice, the power of these Presidiums and at times, their existence,
is in question, statistical studies of the individuals holding membership
in them have not been done.

In describing the type of person who might

belong to one of these bodies, information and trends will have to be
taken from the summaries of Chapters II and III.
Both organizations have the functions of administration and
legislation while their respective plenums are not in session.

The

Presidium of the Council of Ministers in the "inner cabinet" of the
Council of Ministers.

It is the pinnacle of the state bureaucracy.

Table 4-1 describes its members who are selected by Party leaders and
approved by the Supreme Soviet.

With a 17-30 percent representation

from the Politburo (see Table 4-2), and from Table 4-3 an 86-100 percent

TABLE 4-1

MEMBERSHIP REPRESENTATION ON PRESIDIUMS OF THE
SUPREME SOVIET AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Presidium of the Council of Ministers
No. of Members - 14Description - Chairman
Two Deputy First Chairmen
Eleven Deputy Chairmen
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
No. of Members - 39
Description - Chairman
First Vice Chairman
Fifteen Vice Chairmen
Secretary
Other Members
High Party Officials
Women
Workers
Peasants
Politburo Members

SOURCE: John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York:
Harper 8c Row, 1978), p. 186. "Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of
Foreign Government", CIA Reference Aid, 1977» P- &9-
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TABLE 4-2

POLITBURO REPRESENTATION ON PRESIDIUMS OF THE SUPREME
SOVIET AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Year

Number in Politburo

Presidium Membership - %

Presidium of the Counci3. of Ministers
3 (f)

19 6 8

1977

2 (f)

0 (c)

30

O
\-/
O

1964

23

0 (c)

17

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
1962

3 (f)

2 (c)

18

19 6 6

3 (f)

2 (c)

14

1970

3 (f)

2 (c)

18

SOURCE: Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972),
p. 368. "Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments",
C.I.A. Reference Aid, 1977* p- 69-
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TABLE k~3

PROPORTION OF PRESIDIUMS MEMBERSHIP
ON PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Presidium
Supreme Soviet

Council of
Ministers

Year

No. on C. C.

1962

Ik (f) 5 (c)

38

1966

18

5

6k

1970

17

6

6k

1968

12 (f) 0 (c)

1976

12

0 (c) 2 unknown

Percent

100
86

SOURCE: Peter Vaiineman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972),
p. 368. Edward L. Crowley, et al, eds., Prominent Personalities in the
USSR (Metuchen, New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1 9 6 8 ).

8l

TABLE k-b
SOURCES OF MEMBERSHIP FOR PRESIDIUMS OF SUPREME
SOVIET AMD COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

State

Party
Politburo

Presidium of S.S.

Central Committee

Presidium of C* of M.

Secretariat

Supreme Soviet^

Republic Party Officials*

&
Republic Government Official^.

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet

Presidium of the Council of Min

Politburo
Secretariat
Central Committee
Supreme Soviet Deputies
Local Officials
Local Party Officials
NOTE:

Politburo
Secretariat
Central Committee
Supreme Soviet Deputies
Local Government Officials

The same people do not sit on both Presidiums of the Council of
Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet*

SOURCE: Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972),
pp. 317-318.
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representation in the Central Committee, the Party control of the
operations of this body is evident.

The Presidium of the Supreme

Soviet, the plural executive of that body, is given its elite status
by the presence of Brezhnev as its chairman, but its executive and
legislative status by the 1977 Constitution.

Its membership is

described in Table *f-l, with Politburo representation as high as 18
percent, described in Table b-2..

Party domination is further assured

by up to 6 b percent of its membership sitting on the Central Committee
(see Table b-3) •

In accordance with state statutes, membership in

these organizations can absolutely not overlap (see Table b - b ).

Both

of these organizations represent different branches of the Supreme
Sovieti

Overlapping membership could create a government group which

could challenge the pov/er of the Party elite.
The specific responsibilities of the Presidium of the Council
of Ministers is to direct the Council’s work, determine its organization
and composition, exercise a special role in economic matters, and issue
regulations; frequently, it acts in the name of the entire Council.
The chairman is nominally the head of the government apparatus.

2

Unless

he is General Secretary of the CPSU (an impossibility since the fall of
Khrushchev),
be secure.

his tenure in office or position in the Politburo may not

However, if Party leadership falters, the position could be

the basis for a power play, as this Presidium consists of a very

John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York:
Row, 1978), p. 190.

Harper &

Robert Wesson, "Brezhnev’s Year", Current History (October,
1977) > P- 111. To quote from the article, "Hence, in the general ac
ceptance of collective leadership after Khrushchev was toppled, it was
agreed among the oligarchs and ratified by the Central Committee that
no one should combine the leading secretaryship and premiership."

close-knit group of professionals.

Aware of this potential threat,

General Secretary Brezhnev has a habit of addressing the Presidium or
entire council frequently.

The turnover rate of this body is very low

(see Table 4-5).

From 1968 to 1977 > nine years, the turnover rate was

only 29 percent.

Out of nineteen members serving between October 1964

and March 19751 twelve still belonged as of the latter date.
also true of the Presidium of 1977-

4

This was

This continues to illustrate the

closeness, technical skill, and longevity of government ministers.
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet is the legislative authority
during the intervals between the Supreme Soviet sessions.

It can issue

decrees or ordinances on any matter, including taxation, economic policy,
organization of industry, agriculture, transportation, and law enforcement.

5

It also shares executive responsibility with the Council of

Ministers, having such executive tasks as convening and dissolving the
Supreme Soviet, granting awards and decorations, releasing or appointing
members of the Council of Ministers, declaring a state of war, proclaim
ing martial law, and appointing or removing the high command of the army.
Its membership, elected by a joint session of both Supreme Soviet chamber
is rather diverse as is illustrated in Table 4-1, and does include women,
*
Women do not normally belong to top elite organizations of the
Party or state at the All-Union level. They have often been regarded as
politically inferior in Soviet politics. That they might hold membership
on this Presidium is therefore very unusual.
Grey Hodnett, ’’Succession Contingencies in the Soviet Union” ,
Problems of Communism, March-April, 1975 s P- 7*
tz
John S. Reshetar, Jr., op. cit., p. 124.
^Peter Vanneman, ’’The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 321.

TABLE 4-5

MEMBERSHIP IN PRESIDIUM OF THE COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS TURNOVER RATE

Name
A.
K.
D.
N.
V.
V*
M.
V.
I.
L.
N.
M.
I.
K.
N.
Z.
B.
N.
A.
D.
P.

Kosygin
Mazurov
Polyanskiy
Baybakov
Dymshits
Kirillin
Lesechko
Novikov
Novikov
Smirnov
Tikhonov
Yefremov
Arkipov
Katushev
Martynov
Nuriyev
Lomako
Rudnev
Shelepin
Ustinov
Shelest

1968

1964

X
X

X
-

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

“
-

“

X
X
X
X

-

-

X
X
X
-

-

-

1975

X
X
-

1977

X
X
-

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

-

-

X

X
X
X
X

-

X
-

-

-

-

-

“

3 6% remained from 1964 membership
71 $ remained from 1968 membership
86 % remained from 1975 membership

Percentages of 1977 Membership:

SOURCE: Grey Hodnett, "Succession Contingencies in the Soviert
Union", Problems of Communism, March-April, 1975? P- 7- "Chiefs of State
and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments", CIA Reference Aid, 1977?
P. 6 9 .
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lower class workers and peasants.

Due to the type of membership in this

body, the turnover rate is very high.
highest political figures.

Tenure is only assured for the

Since personnel from the Politburo and Central

Committee have increased in the Presidium*s membership, its authority has
increased and it along with the Supreme Soviet has become the chief
'legalizing instrument of the Party. 7
The Soviet politician of these elite government bodies is highly
educated and in most cases, technically skilled, possibly excluding the
token representation of peasants and workers.
most likely Central Committee membership.

He is a Party member with

He more than likely holds a

white collar position and at present, is regarded as a member of the
upper political elite in the Soviet Union.

If he is not a member of the

Politburo, he still may have the opportunity to influence decisions or
legislation.

In recent years, the status of these organizations has

increased and this has, in turn, affected the status of their members.
Though the Council of Ministers and its Presidium are by law subordinate
to both the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium, the practicing relationship
of these bodies is inversely related to their legal status as organs of

g
the state.

A politician of the former Presidium therefore possesses a

little more power and influence than one of the latter.

The Politburo
The pinnacle both in status and power in the Soviet political
system is the Politburo of the CPSU.
originate from it.

7Ibid.
8Ibid.

All major decisions and policy-making

The Central Committee, the Party Congress, and all

8?
organizations of the state, in practice, are subordinate to it.
Membership is limited and recruitment is subjective.

Though its stated

work is to direct the activities of the Central Committee when it is
not in session, in actuality, the Politburo is the controller, policy
maker, and major decision-maker of the entire Soviet political system.
Although it is known that decisions and policy come from the
Politburo, little is known about how it operates, for sessions are held
in secret and no minutes are published.
is even in dispute.

The frequency of its meetings

In 1971 and 1973i Brezhnev is reported to have

declared that it met on Thursdays, at 3^00 in the afternoon.
toldthe 23th Congress that it met forty-three times a year.

9

Later, he
It is

known, however, that all decisions are made collectively under the
presence of a dominant personality (Brezhnev’s at present).

Though

they are reported as unanimous, it is generally known that many times
dissension within the body has occurred.
As its power has increased, the Politburo has seemed to become
involved in political games.

Size and longevity of its membership have

played very significant roles in this.

Since the 1930’s, the number in

the Politburo (at times called the Presidium) has varied (see Table b- 6 ).
Though no definite trend is evident, several politically relevant obser
vations can be made.

In 1939? the membership was reduced to the lowest

in this forty-six year period.

Possible explanations for this could be

Stalin’s mistrust of many of his colleagues or just the lack of qualified
personnel, since the purges had ended in 1938.

In 1932, during the tense

time in Kremlin circles of the ’doctor’s plot’, the enlarging of the

^John S. Reshetar, Jr., op. cit., p. 12*f.

TABLE k-6

MEMBERSHIP IN THE POLITBURO

Year

Full Members

Candidate Members

1930

10

5

193^

10

5

1939

9

2

19^6

11

k

1932

25

11

1936

11

6

1957

15

9

1961

11

5

1966

11

8

1971

15

6

19 7 6 (beginning)

15

7

19 7 6 (end)

16

6
8

19 77

SOURCE: Wasyl Kalynowych, ’’The Top Elite of the Communist Party
of the USSR in 1919-1971” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana
University, 1972), p. 206. Richard F. Staar, ed., Yearbook on Inter
national Communist Affairs, 1975* 1976, 1977 (Stanford, California:
Hoover Institution Press, 1975? 1976, 1977), pp* 8 l, 69, 96.
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Politburo has been related to an attempt to cover up the annihilation
of old Politburo members due to Stalin’s paranoia.^
in 1956, 1957 brought another increase.

Though decreased

This was the time of

Khrushchev’s conflict with the "anti-party" group and his attempt to
recruit his supporters for Politburo positions.^

In the sixties,

membership decreased, but in 1971? again it was expanded, with Brezhnev
bringing in four of his clients

*

as Politburo members.

12

The changing

size of the Politburo can be said to have had significance in the
political maneuvering which has occurred in the Politburo through the
years•
The longevity of membership in recent years has also seemed to
play a role in Politburo politics (refer to Appendix D).

In 1977? 33

percent of the members have served thirteen years since the fall of
Khrushchev in 19&4; 13 percent more had served since 19&7? totalling
46 percent of the 1977 membership having served since 19&7-

Of the

other 53 percent, 2 7 percent were members from 1971 and 26 percent, on
the body for one year or less.

A political speculation can be drawn

In the patronage system which is prevalent in Soviet politics,
as will be discussed in Chapter V, a client is a supporter of one who
is politically high in rank and power. The latter is labeled a patron.
^Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Puled (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1 9 6 5 )? PP* 446-447* The doctor's plot was an affair
in which allegedly doctors assigned to the Kremlin had, through incor
rect diagnosis and improper treatment murdered two top officials and had
conspired with enemy states to undermine the health of leading military
and Kremlin officials. Others felt that it was the pre-eminance of
another purge by Stalin. However, Stalin died suddenly and the purge
was averted.
^"‘‘Tiiomas H. Rigby, "The Soviet Leadership", Soviet Studies
(October, 1970)» P* 171*
12
Myron Rush, "Brezhnev and the Succession Issue", Problems of
Communism (July-August, 1971)* P* 12.
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from these figures.
still on the body.

Before 1971? 60 percent of the 1964 Politburo were
Yet, after 1971^ this majority dropped.

During the

former period, Brezhnev's influence and power were uncertain, but since
the 1 9 7 0 's, they have both grown, along with the number of known supporters of his on the Politburo. 13

Even the pinnacle of the Soviet

political system is not free from the manipulative games of politics.
To analyze the type of person who might achieve membership, the
full members of the 1979-76 Politburo will be studied.

Though Marshal

Greckho died in 1976 and Poliansky was eventually demoted, at the begin
ning of 1 9 7 6 both held membership and therefore, will be included in the
sample.

Table 4-7 is the data from which most of the remaining percent

ages will be derived.
In discussing age in the Politburo, the previous assertion that
the older generation rules the Soviet Union is overwhelmingly supported.
If fifteen years is taken to denote a generation, then two generations
are represented on this Politburo, the 90-69 one with seven representa
tives and the 6 6 -8 l one with eight representatives, with the average age
being 67 years.
so high.

As Table 4-8 shows, this average age has not always been

Yet, with its steady climb since 1992 (excluding the slight

decrease from 1 9 6 1 to 1 9 6 6 ), a generational preference seems evident.
Supporting this is that despite the large turnover rate in the 1 9 7 0 's
the new members were of the same or older generation as their demoted
predecessors.

The older

e l i t e

of the Politburo jealously guards its

position of leadership, reluctant to allow even a minor break through
from younger Party executives.

15Ibid.
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TABLE 4-8

AVERAGE AGE OF POLITBURO MEMBERSHIP
(Including Candidate Members)

1952

1956

1961

1 966

1976

59-8

59-9

61.4

60.4

6 5 .O

SOURCE: Joseph Mastro, "The Soviet Political Elite" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 125•
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Another aspect dealing with the generational situation in the
Soviet political elite is the orientation conflict of the old compared
to the younger executives.

All of the sample Politburo members were

born between 1 8 9 9 and 1920, reaching maturity in the twenties and
thirties and entering the Party, on the average, around 1931-

This

indicates a Stalinist orientation plus a keen awareness of the intrica
cies of Soviet politics since the majority of them survived the chaotic
thirties.

l*f

By comparison, the majority of present party members and

the present Soviet population was not born until after 1930.
people who reached maturity after Stalin’s death.

These are

Their perspective on

life and politics is more likely to be colored by the impact of de~
stalinization as opposed to the years of purges, the continued sacrifice
and the presence of terror. 15
is more than just age.

The difference between the old and young

Even the 1976-77 changes in the full membership

of the Politburo did not alter appreciably the orientation of the
Politburo personnel.

Grigori Romanov, and Dimitri Ustinov were promoted

to take the places of Podgorney, Polyiansky, and Grechko.
born between 1900 and 1922.

*

Both were

The older elite seem to be resisting as

long as possible the turning over of power to the post-Stalin generation
not only because they like to hold power, but also because they distrust
those who have not passed through the trials they underwent.

l6

*
When Podgorny was ’’retired” in 1977» his position in the
Politburo was not replaced, dropping its full membership from 13 to 1^1-,
though later two were promoted to candidate membership, expanding that
to eight.
Joseph P. Mastro, "The Soviet Political Elite” (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 123«
1 5 Ibid., p. 1 2 3 -

■^Robert Wesson, op. cit., p. 133-

95
Educational training of the 1976 Politburo is higher than
might be expected for men of their age in the Soviet Union (see Table
4-7)*

During the twenties and thirties, with the emphasis on indus

trialization and a successful agricultural policy, many institutes of
learning in these fields were founded in the Soviet Union.

'This

accounts for their training, but Khrushchev’s efforts, in part, account
for them being in the Politburo.

In the latter 1950’s Khrushchev

attempted to bring specialists and technocrats into Party career elite
positions within the Party apparatus. 17

Though unpopular then, it has

become the rule in the upper Party organs today.

Not only do 8 7 percent

of the sample have college or institute training, but 6 7 percent have
specialities in engineering, agriculture, or technology.

Only two or

13 percent have just a secondary education with Party School training,
with two also being the number of traditional Party careerists in the
body.

Out of the fifteen full members, only four had any type of Party

School training (refer to Table 4-7)•

The emphasis on education and

technical training seems to have become one of the determinants in
Politburo membership.
As has been shown for other bodies, the Slavic nationalities
dominate the Politburo.

The Russians, in 1976, accounted for 64 percent

of the membership and the Ukrainians, for 14 percent (see Table 4-9)*
The interesting trend shown by that Table is the gross increase in
Russian representation at the expense of Ukrainian and Georgian repre
sentation and an overrepresentation of the Belorrussians.

A possible

17
George Breslauer, "Khrushchev Reconsidered” , Problems of
Communism, September-October, 1976, p. 26.

TABLE h-3

PERCENTILE COMPARISON OF TEE UNION REPUBLICST
POPULATION AND POLITBURO MEMBERSHIP
(including Candidates Members)

Union Republic

Population
1970

1966

Politburo Membership
1971

1976

52.if

6k.O

Russian

33-8

Ukrainian

19.3

2 1 .0

1 9 -0

lif.O

Kazakh

3.3

3-3

if. 8

if. 6

Uzbek

4.9

3-3

if. 8

if. 6

Belorussian

3-7

10.5

9-5

9-1

Georgian

1-9

5-3

if. 8

.0

.9

3-3

if. 8

if. 8

Latvian

SOURCE: V/asyl Kalynowych, "The Top Elite of the Communist Party
of the USSR in 1919”1971H (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana
University, 1972), p. 250.
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explanation could be Brezhnev's growing power and desire to recruit
Russians like himself for membership in order to expand his influence.
The fluctuation of the Kazakh, Uzbek, Belorussian, and Latvian per
centages can be explained by the expansion of the Politburo membership
in 1971 and 197&, but the decrease of Ukrainian and Georgian percentages
indicate a definite decrease in membership.

The control of all state

and Party bodies by the Slavic nationalities implies their importance
in the Soviet Union today.
In discussing the social class origins of the Politburo member
ship, the origin of their fathers does not represent the status of these
political elite today.

These men represent the peak of Soviet society,

the upper stratum of elite, with all the privileges and benefits that
society can bestow upon them.

(To be further discussed in Chapter V)

Their origins, on the other hand, are what would be expected of men born
between 1899 and 1920 (refer to Table 4-7')-

This was the pre- and post-

revolutionary times when the two major social groups in the Soviet Union
were workers and peasants.

Therefore, a 33 percent worker representation,

a bO percent peasant representation, and a 1 3 percent white collar repre
sentation does not seem unusual.

These facts could also testify that

the Soviet regime of the past favored working and peasant classes.

This

may not be true in the future, however, as it is the children of the
*
*
middle and upper classes in the Soviet Union at present who have the
*
In his dissertation, Wasyl Kalynowych defines the middle class
as factory workers, teachers, and local Party bureaucrats. He defines
upper class as high government and Party officials and military and
scientific officials.
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educational and political opportunities which, in turn, could help
them inherit the leadership of the Soviet Union,

l8

To analyze Politburo membership, Party-related characteristics
and career type must be discussed.

In 1978, it had taken an average

of thirty-three years of Party membership before full membership in the
Politburo was achieved.

With the average age of Party entrance rising

above twenty-six years, and the wait for Politburo membership being as
many as thirty-five to fifty years, youth in the Party can expect a
long wait before securing a Politburo position.

With 80 percent of the

1976 members having held candidate Politburo status, this may help to
achieve full membership, but not necessarily shorten the long wait for
it.

The length of candidature for the sample Politburo ranged from one

year nine months to seven years nine months, with the average being four
years five months.

Though four members were coopted into membership

without candidate status, their previous positions and experiences could
account for this.

Pelshe, a Party member since the Revolution, and one

of the few eligible candidates to replace the old Bolshevik Shvernik,
was a respected Party careerist; Grechko held the post of Marshall of the
Soviet Union; Gromyko was well-known in the foreign field; and Kulakov
was a member of the Party Secretariat.
Brezhnev supporters.

19

Also, all four were known as

Longevity in Party membership and Politburo

18

Wasyl Kalynowych, ’’The Top Elite of the Communist Party of the
USSR in I9 1 9 -I9 7 I” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University,
1972), pp. 369-370.
19 Patronage relationships will be discussed in Chapter V. By
way of contrast, Dimitri Ustinov held candidate status for eleven years
before being promoted to full membership in 1977- Originally, he had
not been considered a Brezhnev supporter.
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candidature seem to be two important characteristics in achieving full
Politburo membership.
Career type also plays a role in achieving full membership in
this top elite body.
from 1953 to 1 9 6 6 .

Table 4-10 gives career lines of Politburo members
The dominance of Republic or Oblast First Secretary

status with candidature indicates the importance that the top elite puts
on Republic or Oblast party elite experience in qualifying for Politburo
membership.

The number coopted from the Party Secretariat, without

candidature, implies the importance of holding that position.

Looking at

the 1976 sample and their penultimate positions, of those with candida
ture, 73 percent held Party elite positions while 27 percent held govern
ment elite positions.

Of those without candidature, careers were split

between Party and government elite positions.

Though elite Party posi

tions continue to dominate the career paths of Politburo personnel, an
interesting aspect appears if a comparison is made between the penulti*
mate positions of the 1976 Politburo and their present positions (refer
to Table 4-11).

In their current positions, 55 percent hold, elite Party

positions and 45 percent elite government, an increase of 18 percentage
points for the government elite.

In the case of those without candidate

status, the percentages remain the same.

The conclusion that can be

drawn from this material states that Politburo membership can contribute
to ones cooptation into government elite positions whereas a Party elite
career is the best background in achieving Politburo membership.
*

Present refers to the positions held by the 1976 Politburo at
the beginning of that year.
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TABLE h-11

POSITIONS OF THE 1976 POLITBURO

Member
L.
A.
N.
M.
A.
K.
D.
V.
D.
V.
Y.

Brezhnev
Kosygin
Podgorney
Suslov
Kirilenko
Mazuro
Poliansky
Grishin
Kunaev
Sheherbitsky
Andropov

**

*
Penultimate Position
C. C. Secretary
USSR Min. - Gosplan
Ukrainian Presidium (Party)
C. C. Secretary
First Sec. Sverdlosk Oblast
First Sec. Belorussia
Min. in RSFSR C. of M.
First Sec. Moscow City Org.
First Sec. Kazakh
Ukraine Presidium (Party)
Chr. State Security

Present Position
General Secretary
Chr. USSR Ministers
Chr. of Supreme Sov.
Same
C. C. Secretary
First Dept. C. of M.
Minister of Agri.
Same
Same
First Sec. Ukraine
Same

All the above had candidature
A.
F.
A.
A.

Pelshe
Kulakov
Grechko
Gromyko

Latvian Presidium (Party)
C. C. Secretary
USSR Min. - Defense
Min. of Foreign Affairs

Chr. of Party Control <
Same
Same
Same

All the above did not have candidature
Party Officials among members - 8
State Officials among members - 9
Party Officials who moved to
state positions
- 2
*
Penultimate position means the last position held before gaining full
Politburo membership.
Present position means position held at the beginning of 1976.

SOURCE: Richard F. Staar, ed., Yearbook on International
Communist Affairs, 1976 (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution
Press, 1976), p. 69« Edward L. Crowley, et al, eds., Prominent Per
sonalities in the USSR (Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1968).
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The Politburo of the CPSU is a fascinating subject.

Its

adaptability to new trends has improved the quality of its membership,
yet, conservatism, politics, and its self-perpetuating character has
kept it controlled by a generational elite that jealousy guards its
power.

The politician of the Politburo is a man in his late fifties

or sixties, with a degree in the technical fields.

He has devoted

much of his life to the advancement of his Party career, though he may
hold a government elite position.

His elite career is post-Stalin,

but his orientation is Stalinist.

By nationality, he is Russian; by

origin, from the lower classes, but at present, he is a member Of the
highest elite of his country.

He has held candidate status and opts

for one of his own generation to fill a vacancy in membership.

Achiev

ing full Politburo membership takes ambition, fortitude, Party experi
ence, and an early entrance into a Party career.

The 1976 members seem

to possess all of these characteristics.

Summary
From a comparison between memberships of the Presidiums of the
Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers and of the Politburo of the
CPSU, an interesting picture can be gained of the people who belong to
these top political bodies.

Most are men who belong to the older genera

tion and the Slavic nationality.

They are highly educated with a social

status.

All belong to the Communist Party and most sit on the Central
{
Committee. Overlapping membership between the Politburo and Presidiums
accounts for 39 percent of the Presidiums’ memberships.

This further

supports the assertion that the Party desires to control and direct all
the affairs of the state.

The turnover rate of all three contrasts
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greatly, but that of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers and the
Politburo presents an insight into the difference between the state and
Party elite.

From 1 9 6 7 -6 8 to 19771 the rate of turnover on the Presidium

was 29 percent while on the Politburo, it was 33 percent.

An explana

tion put forth could be the existence of political tactics or games
entering into the recruitment of the latter, while competence and skill
are the major factors of recruiting the former.

As the overlapping

membership and other factors of the memberships of the Politburo and two
Presidiums indicate, the real center of power in the Soviet political
system lies in the Politburo of the Communist Party.

CHAPTER V

THE HUMAN ELEMENT
This chapter deviates from the methodology of the previous
three by presenting a narrative discussion rather than
data in analyzing the Soviet political elite.

statistical

It is included in

order to more fully develop the subject of this thesis.

An inherent

problem in any type of research, especially prevalent in Soviet studies,
is the impossibility of completely covering sensitive subject areas due
to the lack of total information on the subject, the inability to obtain
needed material, or the bias of sources.

Despite these drawbacks, a

clearer picture of this elite group will be created, if along with the
demographic characteristics, the human side, the actions and motives of
this group, are mentioned.

Concepts widely held about Soviet politi

cians which are incorporated in the major and minor hypotheses presented
in Chapter I will be investigated in this chapter.

Three sub-headings

will be used in analyzing this human element-— Patronage, Tactics, and
Elitism and Corruption.

Not only will the intricacies of the Soviet

political system become more apparent through this chapter, but also a
realistic understanding of the Soviet political elite will be completed.

Patronage
Patronage is not unique to the Soviet Union.

With the oligarchic

and centralist nature of the Soviet government, however, the effects of
the practice may be more profound in its political system.

10*f

Patronage in
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the Soviet system refers to the relationship between two individuals,
sharing special ties and assuming such roles in the system that are
conducive to each others' political careers.^

Many theories about

Soviet politics interpret patronage not only as a principal factor
in a leader's rise to power, but also as having a continuous effect
upon a leader's capacity to maintain his power and secure the fulfillment of his

programmatic commitments.

If a higher Party official is

in the position to influence the appointment of members of his Party
organization or a lower one, he will invariably recommend people upon
whom he can rely for support.

3

The move, in the late fifties, to

remove Nikita Khrushchev from the Politburo, might have been successful
had Khrushchev not had the foresight to use his influence in the re
cruitments of cadres for the positions of Central Committee membership.
While there is little evidence that he exercised much influence over
All Union government appointments, his role was dominant in effecting
changes among Party and government officials of the republics, who
betv/een them, make up over half of the Central Committee membership.

If

Qf the 133 full members on the Central Committee in 1956, fifty-six of
them were officials whose careers had been fostered by Khrushchev and

■^Xizhanatham A. Jagannathan, "The Political Recruitment and
Career Patterns of Obkom, First Secretaries from 1952-1969" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1971)? p- 332.
2

Philip Stewart and others, "Political Mobility - Soviet Politi
cal Process", American Political Science Review (December, 1972), p. 1270.
3

Kizhanatham A. Jagannathan, op. cit., p. 332.

If
Thomas H. Rigby, "How Strong is the Leader", Problems of
Communism, September-October, 1962, p. 3-
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some twenty others had similar relationships with Khrushchev,

5

This

fact also contributed to the passage of Khrushchev-sponsored resolu
tions, concerning raising the level of agriculture and consumer produc
tion, at that time.

Leonid Brezhnev has also proven to be adept at the

use of patronage for his own benefit.

As Chapter IV brought out, with

the increase of Brezhnev clients on the Politburo in the 1970's, his
power has increased accordingly.

For the Soviet political elite,

patronage is a practice fervently and widely followed in order to
enhance their career potential.
Patronage is also advantageous to the client, who often is a
man of power or represents real political and organizational interests.
Both Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev owe their political success
to such a relationship, the former to Stalin, the latter to Khrushchev
In i9 6 0 , Leonid Brezhnev, a Politburo member and Central

himself.

Committee Secretary was 'promoted* to the status of Chairman of the
*
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, losing his Secretaryship. Frol Kozlov,
a Khrushchev client, became heir apparent.
Kozlov's retirement.

In 196^-, health forced

Brezhnev, a Khrushchev supporter, regained his

status as a Central Committee Secretary.

After his reinstatement, he

took part in Khrushchev's ouster of 1 9 6 *+, though he refused to give the
speech to the Central Committee that removed his former patron from
office.

7

*
At that date, this position was neither important nor powerful,
but rather, ceremonial.
5 Ibid.
£
Philip Stewart and others, op. cit., p. 1270.
7

Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev, Khrushchev - The Years
in Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 176. John
Dornberg, Brezhnev (New York: Basic Books, 197*0 j P- 16.
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Vasily Mzhavanadze, a Politburo candidate member until 1972
became the ’tool* of his client, Otari Lazishvili, known as the "Soviet

g
version of the Godfather."

Lazishvili made full use of his relation

ship and often boasted to his friends that he could arrange the hiring
and firing of any Republican minister or Party official for the City
of Tbilisi or Republic of Georgia.

The year 1972 brought Lazishvilirs

arrest and conviction and Mzhavandze's ’retirement' from the Politburo.

9

A patronage relationship can often backfire.
Young Party officials make every effort to secure a patron from
among the rising or present Party elite.

The status of client can mean

faster achievement of goals or a preferred positional change.
illustrates known patronage relationships.
movement of some patrons and clients.)
early part of an official's career.

Table 9-1

(Note similarity between the

Such ties usually begin in the

Some characteristics which help in

the establishment of these ties are among the following:
1.
2.
3-

Common background or nationality tie
Contemporaneous attendance in the same educational
institution
^
Association through work in the same place.

The real rulers
Party,

of the country, the officials of the Communist

are promoted, in the majority of instances, through the use of

patronage and pleasing their superiors, not by winning the votes of the
public or their peers.

11

Among Party officials, especially younger ones,

g
Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York:
Times Book Co., 1976), p. 97»

Quadrangle/The New York

9 Ibid.

^Kizhanatham A. Jagannathan, op. cit., p. 333*
"^Robert G. Kaiser, Russia (New York:

Atheneura, 1976), p. 133-

TABLE 5-1

PATRONAGE RELATIONSHIPS
(Several Examples)

Remarks

Client

Patron

N. I. Zhurin

L. Brezhnev

D. S. Polianskii

A. I. Kirichenko Kirichenko was a Politburo
member from 1 9 3 3 -1 9 6 0 ,
Politanskii gained a Council
of Ministers position in i9 6 0 .

A. I.' Adzhubey

N. Khrushchev

Brezhnev lost membership in
C. C. Secretariat in i9 6 0 ,
Zhurin lost C. C. membership
in I9 6 I. Brezhnev returned
to position in 1964, Zhurin
to C. C. in 1966.

Khrushchev was First Secre
tary from early fifties in
1963*> A. I. Adzhubey held
the editorship of Izvestiya
and was youngest member of
C. C. until 1964.

G. T. Stuysky

N. Khrushchev

Khrushchev was Firse Secretary
from early fifties to 1964,
and a Ukranian. Stuysky, a
Ukranian, was personal sec.
to K. and member of Party
Auditing Commission in 1 9 6 1 .
Both lost positions in 1964.

N. A. Kuznetsov

L. Brezhnev

Brezhnev was Dept, to RSFSR
Supr. Sov. at 1 9 6 3 and 1967
convoc. as was Kuznetsov.
Brezhnev, First Sec. of CPSU
from 1964 to present.
Kuznetsov became, his deputy
and a candidate member of
CPSU in 1977 .

SOURCE: Kizhanatham Athinathan Jagannathan, "The Political Re
cruitment and Career Patterns of Obkom First Secretaries from 1932-1969”
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1971), PP342-348.
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this is a sensitive point; they have to admit that no one ever voted to
give them their power and privileges, but both came down to them from
above.

12

Whereas many of the individuals who hold elite Party positions

are well qualified, many are not, achieving their status and privilege
through the patronage system.

Roy Medvedev, a dissident historian,

describes the topic in the following way:
The alarming thing is that advancement is largely dependent on
personal patronage, on friendships, or family connections— poli
tical and professional qualifications are secondary. How else
can one explain the fact that a man who invariably is the subject
of scorn and ridicule in the scientific circles has for seven
years been head of the science section of the Central Committee?
• . . . A senior party official who has been 'working in Minsk
finds jobs in Moscow for those who assisted him in Belorussia,
while a different leader, who was in Moldavia, assiduously
pushes his colleagues from Kishinev up the administrative ladder.
In this way, extraordinary 'spheres of influence' and 'private
domains' are formed within the apparatus of the government— with
'one of our boys' in charge. Individuals are often referred to
as 'so and so's man.'13
Soviet oligarchical rule fosters the attempts by members of the
upper elite to consolidate- their strength and base support by establishing
political strongholds, including forming groups or coalitions of support.
Individuals who reach these high echelons not only possess the power and
status of their political position, but also possess great persuasive
power and personal support.

Successes and losses of Soviet politicians

often determines the careers of those v/hom they have helped.

The influ

ence of the patronage system upon the careers of the Soviet political
elite cannot be minimized; it definitely is the lubricant of the Soviet
political system.

13
Hoy A. Medvedev, On Socialist Democracy (New York:

Knopf, 1975), p. 299-

Alfred
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Tactics
Tactics used in Soviet politics are similar to those in other
political systems, including those used for political gain.

Soviet

politicians are known to maneuver for positions, edge out one another
from important posts, build networks of allies and supporters, and
promote and protect their own careers.

1 *+

. . .
Among the top political, elite,

few real friendships exist; competition for power is usually present.
Bending the law to foster their own careers is not only practices, but
also, accepted by the populace.

During the Watergate era, the Soviet

political elite would not take the situation seriously, while the
average citizen could not understand why a scandal occurred or Nixon
resigned.

Supposedly, moderate realistic Party bureaucrats have been

known to compromise and submerge their own private views in hopes of
moderating policy in a manner similar to the actions of some American
politicans during the Vietnam War era. 15

Political maneuvering also

occurs when filling many vacancies in the elite Party organizations.
Often the career apparatchik is overlooked in favor of a provincial
leader, for the former possesses too much sophistication and worldiness to be fully trusted in top positions.

l6

The ones in charge of

choosing replacements prefer cadres whom they feel they can thoroughly
rely upon.
In order to further analyze the tactics open to the Soviet
political elite, those of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev will
1^
Robert G. Kaiser, op. cit., p. I6 *f.

15
Hedrick Smith, op. crt., p. 293l6 Ibid.

Ill
be used as examples.
politics.

Both men achieved the highest position in Soviet

Though their method was similar, their style and tactics

were totally different.
intellectual.

Nikita Khrushchev was not considered an

Rather, he was the epitome of the self-made Soviet man,

shrewd, earthy, endowed with boundless energy, a bouncy personality,
and a quick wit. 17

His colleagues regarded him as "hardworking, but

uninspired, weak in political theory, a rather ordinary, sometimes
crude man . . .

who would always pay dutiful attention to his 'betters’

(the more experienced Party leaders).'^ 0 leg Penkovskiy, the Soviet
military elite member turned intelligence agent, called him a liar, a
demagogue, and an adventurer who was quite prepared to begin war if
circumstances turned favorable for him. 19

Others have said that he

would have made an excellent collective farm chairman.

Nonetheless,

Nikita Khrushchev rose securely through the Party ranks, gained Stalin's
confidence, and masterfully used analysis and exploitation of the social
and political forces at hand, especially rivalries, to squeeze out his
competition, Malenkov, in particular to become Stalin's heir.
Khrushchev was flamboyant, dynamic, and innovative, often using
these characteristics to overcome his feelings of inferiority due to his
master, the evidence now at hand makes it clear that Khrushchev chafed
under Stalin's restrictions, but at the time no one could match him in
fulsome tributes to his mentor and none was more zealous in defending
17Merle Fainsod, "Khrushchevism in Retrospect", Problems of
Communism (January-February, 1 9 6 5 )1 p- 1.
18

Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev, op. cit., p. 5«

19Oleg Penkovskiy, The Penkovskiy Papers (New York:
& Company, 1 9 6 5 )1 p. 56.

Doubleday

112
Stalin's course. 23

He destalinized the Soviet Union, while at the

same time, restalinizing it.

He declared support, of peaceful co

existence while forcing a crisis in Berlin, furnishing atomic missiles
to Cuba, or sending troops to Hungary.

2k

All these contradictions

earned him the reputation as self-willed, unpredictable, and unorthodox.
He was a master at propaganda and admitted this in many speeches.

"It

may be said that Nikita Khrushchev is again handing out propaganda.
you think so, you are not mistaken.
a propagandist . • . ."

If

Yes, I was, am, and aj.ways shall be

25

Despite his failures and fall, Nikita Khrushchev knew how to
assert his dominance, use people and organizations, make use of the
patronage system, tap grievances, exploit policies, and create confusion
to achieve success.

He was an ingenious politician.

The style of Leonid Brezhnev contrasts with that of his pre
decessor.

He is neither flamboyant nor outgoing, but intelligent,

reserved, and modest.

He is the one who sits back and studies the

situation before initiating action.

At his rise to power, Brezhnev was

described as the true "Soviet manager-politician-executive, the efficient
organization man, the Communist in the grey-flannel suit."

26

However,

some of the methods he used to accomplish this rise mirrored those of
Stalin and Khrushchev.

The strategy had three parts; (a) using the post

23
Merle Fainsod, op. cit., p. 2.

2k

Herman Achminow, "Khrushchev: The Apparatchik Who Fooled the
World", Bulletin: Institute for the Study of the USSR (September, 1971)1
p. 1925
Merle Fainsod, op. cit., p. 2.

26John Dornberg, op. cit., p. 15.

of senior secretary to gain primacy in the Secretariat of the Central
Committee, (b) using the Secretariat to win control over the party
apparatus throughout the country at large, (c) using the party apparatus to establish dominance over the other institutions of the regime.

27

In carrying out. these methods, he made extensive use of the patronage
system as did Khrushchev; he too can be considered a master at it.
The tactics of Brezhnev differ from those of his predecessor.
He is cautious, slow to move, and instinctive in achieving his objective.
He knows v/hen to slap a back, shake a hand, promote a supporter, or
demote an adversary.

28

He is cool, calculating, and cunning, displaying

.the. brilliance of an accomplished, educated politician.

Richard Nixon

29
once pegged him as the ’’best politician in the room.”

Patience and.

fortitude both describe his action in gaining an objective.

To neutral

ize his opposition in the Politburo after 196^-, he ingeniously had
Podgorny removed from the Secretariat and more recently, from the Politiburo; Shelepin was expelled from the Secretariat and later from Politburo,
at Brezhnev's initiative; he< won over Kirilenko and Suslov, at first
potentially strong threats to his rise to power.

30

He delayed the

completion of the new Soviet Constitution until his pov/er base in the
Politburo was strong enough to support his selection as President of the
Soviet Union, enchancing both his personal power and prestige.

In order

not to repeat the same mistakes of Khrushchev of constant reorganizations
27
Myron Rush, ’’Brezhnev and the Succession Issue”, Problems of
Communism (July-August, 1971)j p* 11*

20
John Bornberg, op. eit., p. 172 9 Ibid., p. 1 7 *

30
Myron Rush, op. cit., p. 11.

11**
and replacements of cadres, he waited five years before moving into the
critical area of appointments to policymaking bodies in the provinces
and on the All Union level.

31

Leonid Brezhnev characterizes the quiet, reserved politician.
He stays in the middle, becoming the man upon whom all the interest
groups and the warring and rival lobbies which comprise the Soviet
establishment can agree.

32

Yet, he knows when it is necessary to be

open, joke at a party, or tell an anti-Communist joke.

Though his

programs in reorganization of bureaucratic administrations have gone
slower than desired, he has been able to push through a vigorous land
reclamation program and reforms in industrial management.

Unlike

Khrushchev, he has achieved comradeliness, trust, and respect from
people in the Party and has been the object of honest praise from his
colleagues.

Leonid Brezhnev is not the dynamic, gregarious politician,

but he has been able to ingeniously use analysis, manipulation, and
patience to arrograte to himself a high

degree ofpersonal

power which

is fully supported by his colleagues.
The tactics of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, though
similar by method, vary.

While Khrushchev was ready to attack any given

program and attempt a solution quickly, Brezhnev sits back and waits for
the correct moment, like a mountain lion stalking his prey.

Where

Khrushchev was gregarious and open, Brezhnev remains quiet and aloof. This
reserved manner makes Brezhnev the moredangerous
feelings are never revealed.

opponent for his true

Despite the great ideological differences be

tween the Soviet Union and the Western world, the tactics open to and used by

3 1 Ibid., p. 1 2 .

32
John Dornberg, op. cit., p. 16.

115
the Soviet politicial elite do not vary much from those used by their
colleagues in the West.

Elitism and Corruption
The Soviet Union is an elitist society with a group of people
who are considered socially above the general population.

Though the

elite of the Soviet Union can be divided into two groups, the intelligensia and the political elite, the latter, those who hold important
Party and government All Union positions are the focus of this paper
and will be the only group considered in this discussion.

V/ithin this

group, strata exist depending upon position and importance, with the
entire system of privilege being similarly hierarchial.

An ambitious

young man working his way up through the ranks of the Party can see
ahead the privileges he will receive at each level. 33
The advantages of this elite status range from higher incomes
and access to special shops to private country homes and special medical
care.

Table 5-2 illustrates the differences in income.

Salary levels

in the Soviet Union are somewhat deceptive, for the power elite (upper
to top political elite with the exclusion of military) receive other
prerequisites of power which make their real income almost incalcuable.
While the military and Party elite seem to dominate the higher pay scale,
the latter really does.

In comparison to the minimum wage and worker’s

income, a large gap is evident while the rate of pay of a manager puts him
in a middle range.

In writing his article on "Top Incomes in the USSR."

Mervyn Matthews discusses the problems in acquiring the statistics in
the table.
33
Robert Kaiser, op. cit., p. 177•

TABLE 5-2

INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE SOVIET UNION

Category

Monthly Wage Without Benefits
(in Rubles)*

Upper Range
Marshall of the Soviet Union
General Sec® of the CPSU
Sec. of Cen. Comm
Union Rep. or Oblast First Sec.
Major General
Director of Research for C. C.
Ambassador or Colonel

2 ,0 0 0
900
700 - 800
600
.600
600
500

Middle Range
Coal Manager
Professor - Chief Researcher
Non-Ferrous Manager
Other Managers
Collective Farm Chr.

48o
325 - 325
k20
256 - 390
140 - 30 0

Lower Range

2h0

Editor
Textile Industry Manager
Secretary (Private)
Researcher
Worker
Jr. Researcher
Minimum Wage
NOTES:

1.
2.
3-

215
190
l*f0
130
113
60

Wages do not include bonuses or secondary benefits.
In 1977, Leonid Brezhnev became Marshall of the Soviet
Union, consequently, raising his wage considerably.
The varying ranges refer to areas where positions vary
in importance.

SOURCE: Mervyn Matthews, "Top Incomes in the USSR: Towards a
Definition of the Soviet Elite", Survey (Summer, 1975)? PP- 7-13-
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. . . Soviet censors have set an upper limit for published
wage studies . . . .
The highest figures to come to our
notice in openly published discussion of wages and incomes
were intervals of 3 0 0 to over 400 rubles per month . . .
this may be provisionally accepted as a rule-of-thumb lower
limit for elite salaries.
. . . other pieces of evidence make a figure of ^30 rubles
for the head of an elite household in the early seventies
seem reasonable . . . .
A salary of ^50 rubles was about
seven times the mipimum wage and three and one-half times
the average wage.^
The difference in wage as described by Mr. Matthews may not be what
they seem, for the existence of secondary benefits for the political
elite drastically changes their income status.
Secondary benefits for these Soviet elites come in several
categories:

confidential monetary payments, restricted goods and

services, and access to special advantages reserved exclusively for
those of elite status.

The first benefit is the "thirteenth month"

salary, an automatic payment to the top political elite that requires no
extra effort.

The second benefit, "the Kremlin ration", is special

*goldr rubles worth more than their face value in state run special out
lets and shops.

These come in 16 to 32 denomination which apparently

indicate two categories of seniority. 35
elite households.

This benefit reaches nearly all

The amount received of either benefit is determined

by the level and status of the elite member.

Those receiving these are

given access to one, two, or all three types of special shopping.

A

closed distributor handles high quality Soviet and Western goods at low
prices.

Restricted outlets carry quality Soviet goods, unavailable or

unobtainable in ordinary shops, at only slightly lower prices.

Foreign

Mervyn Matthews, "Top Incomes in the USSR: Towards a Defini
tion of the Soviet Elite", Survey (Summer, 1973)i p* 735Ibid., p. 15.
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currency shops have superior Soviet and Western goods, sold well below
normal Soviet prices.

None but an elite member with a special pass is

allowed entrance to any one of these.

The reaction to these shops by

the average Russian citizen is resentment.
Many Russians are infuriated at the existence of these stores
which are, in effect, a consumer goods sector where Soviet
currency is not accepted. ’It is so humiliating to have stores
in our country where our own money is not valid,’ fumed a white
collar worker.
'Not only is the money not good, but people
without
rmission to shop there are turned away by door
guards.
Soviet political elite enjoy other privileges directly connected
with their status.

All top government and Party institutions have their

own buffets with high quality food and take-out service.

Luxurious,

noncrowded holiday resorts are available to members of upper elite
members of upper elite organizations for free or low prices.

Special

medical care, known as the Fourth Directory of the Ministry, accompanies
this elite status, while state-approved purchasable •medical services are
available to these people at a price.

Housing for elites includes

rented or owned dachas, such special superior apartment complexes as
those run by the Central Committee and KGB, or owned apartments in
housing cooperatives.
obtain decent housing.

The higher the position, the easier it is to
Top officials such as Brezhnev and Kosygin

maintain, at least, an apartment in Moscow and a dacha in the country
side.

Other advantages enjoyed include private chauffeur-driven

limousines for the top elite, a special ticket office for all cultural
events in Moscow, and access to foreign goods from friends traveling
36
Hedrick Smith, op. cit., p. 28.
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abroad, 37

A superior style of living results from ail these benefits

for the Soviet elite.

Though their distribution among the strata of

the elite varies, it is safe to presume that these benefits increase
income ratings of this elite type occupations by perhaps a factor of
fifty to one hundred percent.

38

Those who form the top Soviet political elite live an incredibly
different life than the average Soviet citizen.

39

In Russia, they are

called the nachalstvo, an untranslatable word, whose literal meaning is
"the authorities", but whose true sense is more "the big cheeses."

4-0

An example of their separate way of life is illustrated through the
following:

y

A Russian workingman, as he watched a long, handmade Zil
limosine roar down the reserved center land of Kutuzovski
Prospect in Moscow, preceded by a yellow police car, com
mented, ’The nachalstvo never sees how the rest of us live.
They go from home to office and home again, escorted all
i the way. They never go out shopping, stuff is brought to
them. They don’t even go to the barber, the barber comes
to them and gives them all kinds of special services.
Their wives don’t do the cooking, their maids do. They
are always under control, I mean surrounded by police,
escorted here and there. No, they don't see what you and
I see. They never wait in line. What kind of life is
that?'^
■zn

Oleg Penkovshiy, op. cit., pp. 188-191* He cites, "When some
goes abroad, everyone wants him to buy some presents or just some things
a person needs which are impossible to get in Moscow . . . .
Prior to
my next regular trip to London . . . Mrs. Serov gave me a long list of
things to buy in Paris and her husband asked me to buy him a lightweight
tennis jacket . . . ." (This was only in his elite circles.)
38

Mervyn Matthews, op. cit., p. 25*

39Robert G. Kaiser, op. cit., p. 173•

401.

Ibid.

4l.
'Ibid., p. 176.
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The leaders apparently attempt to appear like everyone else, without
class and occupational distinctions, but their privileges keep them
from it.

Their families are secluded from publicity, and the absence

of knowledge about them tends to make them seem unlike other Soviet
citizens.

42

This separation is more evident in the attitudes of their

children as described by Oleg Penkovskiy, "Their children despise
everything Soviet, watch only foreign movie films, and look down on
4^
ordinary people." ^

The life of luxury has its benefits, favortism,

isolation, and obscurity.
In Chapter III, an often found characteristic of the Soviet
political elite was expressed, that of hypocrisy.

Though this elite

should represent the epitome of the ''New. Soviet Man', they live a life
of luxury.

Though they profess sincere dedication to the tenets of

Marxist-Leninisrn, believing in honest and integrity, they lie, deceive,
scheme against each other, inform on each other, and 'cut each others
throats.'

44

Though they express contempt for capitalism and self-

gratification, in their pursuit of more money and advancement for them
selves, they become informants for the KGB on their friends and fellow
workers.

4s

Oleg Penkovskiy describes their life in this way,

Our Communism, which we now have been building for almost
forty-five years is a fraud. I myself am p'art of this fraud;
after all, I have been one of the privileges . . . I praise
our leaders, but inside me I wish them death . . . I feel
contempt for myself because I am part of this system and I
live a lie. °
42
Kenneth Ciboski, "Recruitment of the Soviet Politburo" (unpub
lished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Washington, 1971)? P- 112.
43
44

Oleg Penkovskiy, op. cit., p. 55*
Ibid.

^Ibid., p. 56.

^Ibid.
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Others express this same thought.

In his book The Russians, Hedrick

Smith writes,
With a kind of deliberate schizophrenia, they divide their
existence into their public lives and their private lives,
distinguishing between ’official1 relationships and personal
relationships . . . .
So they adopt two very different
codes of behavior . . . ’Our public ljjLfe is living a lie,’
commented an elite physicist . . . •*
A young apparatchik once said to an American at a party,
’. . . But what I say and what I am thinking when I am saying
it are two different things.
Soviet propaganda supports a life of lying.

It says, ’We have every

thing in the Soviet Union and everything we have is better than the
West’, yet, the upper elite acquire many Western goods in preference
49
tOiSoviet goods.
Another slogan professes, 'In our Soviet socialist
society, everything is available, everything is the best’, yet, even
SO
socks and underwear are difficult to obtain.'
Leonid Brezhnev does not escape this lie.

Even the fevered leader

Though regarded as the

’perfect’ Party man, he is one who loves the good life, expensive
clothes, fast and ostentatious cars, thoroughbred horses, lodge seats
qi
at Moscow’s Dyamo and .Lenin Stadiums, and yachting on the Black Sea.""
There are members of the Soviet political elite who sincerely believe
in the greatness of Communism and all its tenets.

However, there are

also many who will do anything to maintain or improve their present
status, even to living a lie.
47
Hedrick Smith, op. cit., p. 105.
AS
A9

Ibid., p. 298.
Oleg Penkovskiy, op. cit., p. 191.

5 °Ibid.

51John Dornberg, op. cit., p. 18.

122
Two other factors, possibly a result of the Soviet elite system
seem widespread in the Soviet political system.
corruption.

These are mistrust and

The first seems to not only be a characteristic of the

citizens* feelings toward their leaders and each other, but also, vice
versa, while corruption remains an inescapable fact of daily life
throughout the Soviet Union in the lives of both the elite and the
masses.

52

With the Communist dogma the ever present ideological back

ground upon which the entire Soviet state is built, the political elite,
whether sincerely believing in its principles or not, must alv/ays pro
fess profound devotion to the Communist way of life and the MarxistLeninist doctrine.

This constant declaration is a necessity, for one

never is sure of his position or who may be listening in.

Several

examples explain this phenomenon:
’Human relations are a deadly serious business here,* a
member of the elite establishment once commented, *We
resent it if a foreigner comes to a party and brings along
Russian friends. It ruins the evening for us because it
takes us a long time to know someone and come to trust them.’
’You can’t trust anyone but your pillow.* One young man
cursed bitterly, after learning that one of his long-time
friends had informed on him to the KGB.
’Another member of the elite once commented, ’You know, we
have lived next door to another couple all our lives
practically. I have known the wife since childhood and yet,
I have never told her the honest truth . . . .
They are
different people from us.*53
Leona Schecter, an American, describes her and her family’s reaction to
this characteristic of mistrust in Soviet society, after they decided to
leave Moscow, permanently, after two years of living there.

(Their

lives touched both the elite of the society and the masses.)
52

"Bribery, Embezzlement, A Way of Life In Russia” , Daily Press,
by Craig R. Whitney, Sunday, May 7i 1978, p. Al 8 .
53
Hedrick Smith, op. cit., pp. 109-110.
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By the time we left Moscow, we felt we had lost our innocence.
We made friends with people we didn't trust, distrusted our
real friends at time . . . .
The Soviet Union had little to
teach us in the positive sense. After almost two years, we
felt we had emotionally been to the end of the world . . . .
The children acquired a veneer . . . reticent to speak freely
and openly with people we didn't know well. They were careful
and guarded, secretive about mentioning a friend’s name v/hen
repeating some bit of information he had given us. Trust
because reserved, finally, only for the family.5^
The Soviet society is also one in which the leaders mistrust
the citizens. 55

They lack complete confidence m

their mandate to rule

so they contrive magnanimous demonstrations of loyalty to lay their
doubts to rest.

In Russia, this is called ’pokazuka’ which, though

having no English translation, comes from the verb to show off; the
slang noun means, roughly, something one does for the sake of doing it,
for show; by definition, the act involved is one of no material consequences, but it looks good.

56

Further evidence of this mistrust is that

public voting is always reported as unanimous and speeches on public
occasions alv/ays praise the leaders and society's accomplishments. 57
Within the Soviet society, trust- is an ideal to be hoped for, honesty
nearly as unknown, friendships fragile, and secretism a way of life.
Corruption

*

is another disease that is rampant in Soviet society,

reaching high into the elite Party and government ranks.
various forms.

Bribery is one of the most prevalent.

It appears in

Lenin called

Corruption is the behavior of public officials which deviates
from the accepted norms, in order to serve private needs.
5*f

(Boston:

Leona and Jerrold Schecter, An American Family in Moscow
Little, Brown, and Co., 1975)» PP* *f00-^01.
"

55
Robert G. Kaiser, op. cit., p. 159*
^ I b i d . , p. 1 6 0 .
57Ibid., p. 159.
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bribery *the -worst- enemy of the revolution1, whereas almost fifty years
later, Nikita Khrushchev tried to stamp it out, 'this disgraceful
survival of the past* by ordering the death penalty for serious
bribery.

58

Leonid Brezhnev has continued his predecessors* attack by

calling for a continued struggle against such vestiges of the past as
*money-grubbing, bribery, etc.* 59

A typical example of this is paying

off an official in order to have an off-spring accepted into a pre
ferred institute of learning or receive a sought-after position.

Other

examples involving bribery are selling off state resources, granting
apartment permits, receiving diplomas without earning- them (refer to
Chapter III) and allotting plots of land for dachas as payoffs.^

At

the high levels of society, it is not necessary to pay off grocery
clerks for special merchandise or a foreign friend for currency coupons
for the upper elite have their own special stores.

But, "that's cor

ruption in itself", a resentful young Party member has said, "it's why
the leadership doesn't talk much about corruption anymore . . . .
They're silent because they're all involved."

6l

The leaders and the

press do call for reform, but this is often ignored, due to the involve
ment, at high levels, of officials.
Embezzlement is another form of corruption prevalent in Soviet
society.

Millions of dollars are known to have been taken from state

enterprises.

The most celebrated case related to this was of Yekaterina

58
Craig R. Whitney, op. cit., p. Al8 .
59

Steven J. Staats, "Corruption in the Soviet System", Problems
of Communism (January-February, 1972), p. 43.
6 0 x,
Ibid.

^Craig R. Whitney, op. cit., p. Al8.
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Furtseva, the Minister of Culture and a

favorite of Khrushchev’s, In

the spring of 1 9 7 ^+> it surfaced that she had built a dacha in the
country worth about $lb5»00Q with state-owned materials obtained
through fraud.

62

The scandal included the fact that she was building

it openly in her daughter's name which constitutes passing on the
6^
perquisites of power to the next generation, forbidden by Soviet law. "

She was required to pay the state about $80,000 for the dacha (an
amount which she was able to produce in
seat in the Supreme Soviet.

only a. few days) and losther

Yet, she retained her position as Minister

of Culture until she died, later that year.

Another example is the

case of Vasily Mzhavanadze, a candidate member of the Politburo.

As

previously mentioned, he was 'retired' from his position due to his
connections with one Otari Lasishvili who had built up a network of
underground private enterprises together with other businessmen.
Lazishvili had, as reported, swindled the state out of over 1.7 million
rubles in funds and goods.

64

Reportedly, he was able to do this be

cause he was in partnership with Mrs. Vasily Mzhavanadze while her
husband sat on the Politburo.

As previously stated, the year 1972

brought an end to this scandal.
Another form of corruption involving high officials is referred
to as 'blat't the use of personal influence to obtain favors to which a
certain department, enterprise, or official is not legally or formally
63
entitled. '

The upper political elite become involved when enterprises

6 2 Ibid.

63.Hedrick Smith, op. cit., p. 100.
64
°^Ibid., p. 9 7 65

Steven J. Staats, op. cit., p. 42.
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under their control cannot fulfill a quota or lack necessary inventory.
In many cases, if this occurs, the chairman or manager is urged by the
controlling official to use the parallel market, that market of goods
and services which functions outside the system of institutionalized
economic relationships, beyond government controls.

66

The ironical

thing about this form of corruption is that in certain circumstances,
on a limited scale, it makes an important contribution to organizational
efficiency and goal fulfillment.
Other forms of corruption, on a more personal scale, thrive.
Oleg Penkovskiy wrote,
The sons, daughters, and son-in-laws of all important Party
and government officials finish higher educational institu
tions and get good jobs . . . everything is done by pull,
through friends and family connections. Though the news
papers scream that nepotism must be stamped out, they only
punish some factory director for giving a job to his niece.
Khrushchev's son-in-law was the chief editor of the newspaper Izvestiya
during his father-in-law's reign.

He often wrote on Communist morality,

yet in private life, had to be; reprimanded by Khrushchev to be more
careful about his 'adventures'.

He also was known to put his name to

someone else's work, winning the Lenin Prize once when he did this.

68

As in other political systems, instances of moral corruption or 'fixing
of the law' occur among the political elite, but these are minor com
pared to the other forms of corruption prevalent in the society.

66

Dimitri K. Siraes, "The Parallel Market", Survey, Autumn,
197^, p. 51.

Cj?
Oleg Penkovskiy, op. cit., pp. 211-212.

68tk.,
Ibid.

127
It has been suggested that one of the reasons that corruption
continues to thrive in the Soviet Union is because it allows, in the
masses, the feeling that they are able to manipulate and influence the
system in which they live, therefore, making it more tolerable.

It

also leads to consolidation and unity of the two parallel hierarchies
through patronage and nepotism, forcing them to work together to cut
corners, break laws and regulations, defraud higher supervisory organizations, and engage in other illegal practices to fulfill goals.
also allows the elites to preserve their place in society.

69

It

'There is

little hope that corruption will be eradicated from the Soviet society
for it performs too many important functions.

Summary
The Soviet political elite do not epitomize the ’New Soviet Man.*
They possess.all the desires, attributes, and shortcomings of any human
being.

They prefer a life with materialistic rewards rather than ideo

logical goals.

The society in which they live fosters the use of

patronage in achieving personal and public success, making it the major
factor in political mobility.

Political tactics, maneuvers, and techni

ques are used extensively, especially in furthering careers.

A superior

social and materialistic status are enjoyed by members of this group
with even a weakness for corruption being present.

The Soviet politi

cal elite pose a strong resemblance to their counterparts in other
countries.

They seem to be approaching the mode of capitalistic politi

cians rather than that of the ’New Soviet Man.*
69
1
^Steven J. Staats, op. cit., p. A
7.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION
A picture of the All Union Soviet political elite has been
developed through the material presented in this thesis.

They are a

select group of middle-aged men, educated, with white collar positions
in Soviet society.

Though the theoretical ideal of the lowly worker or

peasant achieving political heights is still professed, this analysis
has shown that this myth appears only to be a reality in the Politburo,
whose members have jealously guarded their generational control for
years.

In the other bodies, occupational representation clearly shows
*
the dominance of white collar representation, with most members holding

professional positions in the state or Party heirarchy.

Whatever the

social origin or occupational representation, members of the All Union
organizations covered are currently considered part of the elite stratum
of Soviet society, with benefits and pay that distinguish them from the
average Soviet citizen.

The age factor in the description shows the

dominance of the older generation in all the All Union political bodies.
With the recruitment practices of Soviet politics, there seems to be
little chance that this trend will change in the near future.
The majority of the political elite is of Slavic nationality
with Russian predominating.

However, to guard against an outbreak of

*
Social class origins may, like the Politburo, be mostly from
the lower classes as the sample for the Council of Ministers indicates.
However, data in the area for the Supreme Soviet, Party Congress, and
Central Committee was not available.
128
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localism plus appear to be following Marx's tenet of mass participation
in the government, the Supreme Soviet, as the state's representative
assembly, has an overrepresentation of the minorities "rather than the
Slavs.

This also gives the regime better access to the feelings and

reactions of all the population.
The use of political tactics is vital to the career of Soviet
politicians.

One wrong decision could destroy what it has taken a

lifetime to achieve.

Seeking the services of a more prominent indi

vidual whom the political elite pledge to support for purposes of
advancing their own careers is a practice fervently followed in Soviet
politics, while the existence of corruption in political circles is
widespread.

The All Union Soviet political elite is a unique group of

people, whose study uncovers many revealing aspects of the Soviet
political system.
Major Hypotheses
Of the major hypotheses offered in Chapter I, the investigations
carried out through this research resulted in the support of three and
the rejection of one.

In order to treat each hypothesis with clarity

and understanding, methodology similar to that used in the Objective
and Hypotheses section of Chapter I will be followed.
1.

The Soviet political elite is a middle-aged group of
conservative men.
The evidence gathered in this research on the whole
supported this hypothesis.

Middle age, forty years or older,

dominates the memberships of the political bodies discussed
in this thesis.

Whereas the Supreme Soviet and Party
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Congress were found to have 50 to 70 percent of their
memberships over the age of forty, the Central Committee,
reflecting the Council of Ministers' membership as well as
its Presidium, and the Politburo, were shown to have 90 to
1 0 0 percent of their membership over the age of forty.

This group has dominated these memberships since the sixties
and there is little evidence that this trend is changing.
With Brezhnev's rise to power in 19^^, the entire
character of the Soviet political system changed.

Rather

than launching in to sudden schemes or innovations, charac
teristic of Khrushchev's reign, conservatism and maintaining
the status quo came to predominate in Soviet politics.
Older age of members and low turnover rates, for the most
part, in recent years in the All Union political bodies,
seem to project this trend.

Robert Wesson specifically

describes this conservatism in Soviet politics by saying,
In recent years, the Soviet political scene has
generally been monotonously placid, with hardly
any signs of the kind of controversy that bub
bled up during the reign of the ebullient
Premier Nikita Khrushchev.^
The personality and style of Leonid Brezhnev seems to have
had the most effect on this new trend (refer to Chapter V).
John Domberg describes Brezhnev as ". . . a conservative . . .
who takes few chances . . .

does not implement wild schemes

^Robert Wesson, "Brezhnev's Year", Current History (October,
1977), p. 109..
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to solve problems . . .
or have others rock it."

who does not like to rock the boat
2

The fact that the political elite of the Soviet
Union consists mostly of men hints at the 'unwritten1 descrimination of women in political circles.

Though the two

lower political elite bodies, the Supreme Soviet and the
Party Congress, show up to 23 percent women representation,
since the death of Yekaterina Furtseva in 197^, no woman has
held All Union ministerial or Politburo membership.

Sta

tistics are unavailable for their representation in the
Central Committee but no source consulted hinted at it in
this body.

Though the political elites at all levels of

the government and Party heirarchies were not investigated,
for those of the memberships researched, the first hypothe
sis seems valid.
2.

Successful careers of the Soviet political elite are related
to educational level, nationality group, age and occupational
sta.bus.
Successful careers can be defined in two different
ways.

One deals with contentment in career choice while the

other concerns advancement and enhancement of status.

If

the former definition is used, though this research does not
claim to have covered this subject in that trend, the
hypothesis would have to be rejected due to the often
p

John Dornberg, Brezhnev (New York:

Basic Books, 197^), p« 33«
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existing conflict between the public and private lives of
the Soviet political elite, the paranoia that someone is
always watching or listening, the must of pleasing often
ill-qualified superiors, and the necessity of carrying out
undesirable orders.

From these characteristics of Soviet

political careers, career frustration could develop regard
less of educational level, nationality group, age, or occu
pational status.
On the other hand, if the definition of enhancement
or advancement of status is used, then, the hypothesis was
supported through the evidence presented in this paper.

In.

each political organization, the educational level of the
memberships was either very high or showing an increasing
trend.

Percentages for those with college or institute

educations for the most recent years of the individual data
ranged from ^8 percent for the Supreme Soviet deputies to
over 8 7 percent for Politburo members while members with
only an elementary education ranged from 0 percent for
Politburo members to 20 percent for Supreme Soviet deputies.
The evidence seemed to support the assertions that educa
tional level among the All Union political elite was rising
and the higher the position desired, the higher the level
ones education needed to be.
While the Russian nationality predominated in all
the organizations studied, ranging from kj> percent to 6 A
percent of the total memberships, compared to the nearest
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population census, it was overrepresented in all cases
except the Supreme Soviet.

The situation for a combined

Slavic representation was similar.

With the percentages

ranging from 59 percent to 8? percent, this group con
trolled each organization, even the Supreme Soviet.

But,

again, in the Supreme Soviet, the group was underrepre
sented.

The regime needs one organization where the

minorities seem to be fully represented in order to give
those citizens as well as the leaders a feeling of support
for each other.

Also, in Soviet politics, it is those of

Slavic nationality, especially Russian, who achieve higher
political position.
As previously mentioned, middle age or over forty
years is the most dominant age for the lower political
elite; over fifty for the upper elite; and over fifty-seven
for the top political elite.

The youth in the Party or

government heirarchy stand little opportunity at elite posi
tions until they have reached these age plateaus.

With the

older generation continually protecting its control, as
related in the material, opportunity for a movement of youth
into influential positions does not seem to be open.

The

older the political elite, the more the opportunity there is
to become a member of the upper or top bodies of the govern
ment or Party heirarchies.
Occupationally, the majority of the All Union politi
cal elite hold white collar, if not professional, positions.
Worker and peasant representation is only substantial in the

13^
two lowest political elite bodies, the Supreme Soviet and
the Party Congress.

As mentioned in Chapter II, those

figures might even be misleading.

With the preference for

the white collar background in the memberships, representa
tion from the worker or peasant classes have less opportunity
for participation in the Soviet political process.
research supports the second hypothesis.

This

The best qualifi

cations for a successful career in Soviet politics is being
of middle or older age, having institute or college training,
being Slavic or especially Russian, and holding a white collar
position in the state or Party heirarchies.
3*

The Soviet political elite epitomizes the MNew Soviet Man”.
The evidence contained in this thesis rejects this
hypothesis.

Either the Communist theoreticians were naive

to think human nature could be so molded to eliminate sel
fishness and desire from a person’s makeup or the Soviet
society has not yet reached the stage at which this re
vamping of human nature can take place.^

The Soviet

politicians were found to be motivated by self-interest,
ambition, and achievement of material success rather than
a great dedication to Communist ideology.

They will use

manipulative tactics to reach these goals, patronage to
obtain purposeful friendships, and corruption, if needed,
to secure success.
3

This group relishes the privileged life

Karel Hulicka and Irene M. Hulicka, Soviet Institutions The
Individual and Society (Boston, Mass.: The Christopher Publishing
House, 1 9 6 7 )~ p . 6l8.
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that accompanies their status in Soviet society and does not
appear to be willing to put ideology or goals of the state
above personal comfort.

In the West, Leonid Brezhnev and

Alexis Kosygin are often regarded as examples of the 'New
Soviet Man*.

This assumption is grossly misguided.

Both

men, like other members of the elite, especially upper elite,
are protective of their status and privilege, even proud of
them.

Muscovites find this entire situation, especially the

life style, such a mockery of Marxist ideals that they make
fun of it with a joke on Brezhnev.

k

Brezhnev wanted to impress his mother on how well
he had done in his career. He decided to invite
her up from their home in Dneprodzerzhinsk, in the
Ukraine and show her his ample in-town apartment,
but she was nonplussed, even a little ill-at-ease.
So he called the Kremlin, ordered his Zil, and
they sped out to his dacha near Usovo, one used
previously by Stalin and Khrushchev. He took her
all around, showed her each room, showed her the
handsome grounds, but still she said nothing. So
he called for his personal helicopter and flew her
straight to his hunting lodge at Zavidovo. There,
he escorted her to the banquet room, grandly dis
playing the big fireplace, his guns, the whole bit
and, unable to restrain himself any longer, asked
her pleadingly, 'Tell me Mama, what do you think?'
'Well,' she hesitated, 'It's good Leonid. But
what if the Reds come back?'^
With the life of these elites being so divorced from
that of the average citizen, the stage of social consciousness

Zil is the name for a Russian-made limousine.
Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York:
York Times Book Co., 197&), p- 38^Ibid.

Quadrangle/The New
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which must be achieved to mold the 'New Soviet Man1 seems
not yet to have been reached.
Karel and Irene Hulicka speak of this topic in the
following words:
Ever since the Party has been in power, it has
been working on the problem of modifying the
behavior and attitudes of people to conform with
the type of society which it has attempted to
build . . . .
Its goal is two-fold and circular,
to perfect social organizations so that the
members of society may be perfected gradually
and at the same time to transform people into
higher social beings who will participate
actively in the process of perfecting
society . . . .
Although the party has had
partial success in preparing some of the pre
requisites for changes which it desires, there
is no tangible evidence to support the hypothesis
that it will be able to mold human nature in
accordance with its goals . . .
The 'New Soviet Man' has not appeared yet in Soviet
society.

The evidence in this paper strongly suggests he

won't, but science indicates that one is seldom justified in
drawing conclusions about the results of an experiment before
it is concluded.
4.

7

The Soviet political elite constitute an upper class in Soviet
society.
The support or rejection of this hypothesis depends
upon the definition which is attached to the word class.

8 For

^Karel Hulicka and Irene M. Hulicka, op. cit., pp. 6l8-62^.
*^Ibid., p. 6 2 *f.
g
Eugeni Ivanov, the Secretary for Far Eastern Political Affairs
at the Soviet Embassy in 1976 told this author that 'class refers to
land ownership' and since all land is owned by the state, then there are
no classes in the Soviet Union. However, as will be discussed, the
holding of private property exists in the Soviet Union. If that means
actual land, the sources were unclear on that point.
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the purposes of this discussion, class will be defined in
the manner set out in Chapter I for social class.

Using

that definition, this research has supported this hypothesis.
Hedrick Smith describes Soviet thoughts on the social struc
ture in Soviet society.

"Officially in the Soviet Union,

there are two equal classes, the workers and the peasants and
a 'stratum* of employees."

9

It is the 'stratum' that consti

tutes the elite group of Soviet society of which the political
elite is the group with powder.

That group has developed into

such an upper class, that the description of Soviet society as
'classless' also seems almost a mockery of the teachings of
Marx.

The Soviet system has institutionalized a double

standard in life styles— for the elite especially political
elite and for the masses— ; these elite take their advantages
for granted with an arrogant distain for the common man that
often surpasses the haughtiest rich in the West.^
Chapter V of this thesis describes all the privileges
and benefits accorded to this upper class, rising in amount
with the importance of ones position in the state or Party
hierarchy.

At the very top, the great amount of privileges

insulates that group from all the harassments and discom
forts of an ordinary citizen.'*''1" Chapter II gives further
evidence that the state supports this distinction by

^Hedrick Smith, op. cit., pp. 28-29.
^ I b i d . , p. ^-3*
^■Robert Kaiser, Russia (New York:

Atheneum, 1976), p. 177*

138
offering attractive inducements to Supreme Soviet deputies,
while Chapter III illustrates the link between social origin
and/or occupational representation and political elite
careers in the Soviet political system.
The system of privilege among the political elites
has been so entrenched in Soviet society that dissidents have
taken to speak out against it.

Roy Medevev, one such spoke-

man, advocates a toning down of this practice.
. . . It is in the interest of socialist society
that its leaders have everything they need, since
prosperity and well being of the whole people
depend upon the quality of their work. They are
in fact representatives of the nation and this
function also requires additional expense . . . .
An individual's talent is not just his own per
sonal possession but also belongs to the whole
people— society must nourish it with the care and
attention it deserves. There is the danger how
ever that this whole system of special privilegecan become self-serving and change from a means
to an end. And it is often the case that privi
leges tend to multiply out of proportion . . .
when privileges are granted from above in the
absence of public supervision, it is much easier
for them to become excessive, leading to secret
perogatives and the abuse of high office.^
This research concludes that the Soviet Sfnion is not
a 'classless' society.

Its political elite is an upper class.

The life-style of top Soviet government and Party officials
with their foreign travel, ample expense allowances, imported
clothes, dachas and servants, access to special shopping is
as far beyond the ken of a Russian steel worker or a milk
maid on a collective farm as the life style of the jet set

Ttoy A. Medevev, On Socialist Democracy (New York:
Knopf, 1975), p. 227.

Alfred
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American is from the life of a Detroit auto worker or a
migrant farm laborer in California*

13

A Soviet citizen who

is aware of the life of the political elite and desires it
can only secure it through official status in the govern
ment or Party,

No amount of money can buy this way of life.

As a senior state official and Party member told writer Robert
Kaiser, "We are attracting good young people into the Party
and government apparatus, not for idealistic reasons, but for
practical reasons."^
To balance this discussion, arguments often used by
Soviets, including Marxist minded dissidents, to disclaim
that Soviet society has given birth to a new class will be
mentioned.

First, while the children of successful people

tend to inherit part of their parents* status, generally it
is not possible to pass on great wealth or political power. 15
Second, whereas one day an official may enjoy the respect of
his colleagues and all the comforts that the state can extend
to him, the next day this could all be taken away, for if one
loses his position, he loses everything.

l6

However, reality

somewhat changes the facts in these arguments.

The power

elite, by placing children or relatives in prestigious insti
tutes, as long as they are not demoted, really do provide for
13Hedrick Smith, op. cit,, p. 51«
1 if
Robert Kaiser, op. cit., p. 192.
1 5 Ibid., p. l8 l.

l6

Hedrick Smith, op. cit., pp. ^9-50.

long term status for the next family generation.
intelligensia are able to pass on private wealth.)

(Successful
As

illustrated, both in the Chapters and this conclusion, any
attempt to transform Soviet society into the Marxist of
fclassless' has yet to succeed.
Robert Kaiser adds an annodote to his discussion on
privilege in Russia in his book Russia which not only suggest
the real, reason why Nikita Khrushchev was ousted, but also,
hints at the feelings of the populace toward those of the
privileged class in their society.
Khrushchev had the reputation, especially among
intellectuals in Moscow, of being a relatively
austere man, less interested in the privileges
of power than many of his colleagues. One rumor
which spread through the capital a few years ago
(in the late sixties and early seventies) was
that Brezhnev, Kosygin and the others moved
against Khrushchev in 196^ when they learned he
planned to do away with many of their privileges.
I never learned where this story originated and
it may be baseless, but it does indicate the
sort of thing many Muscovites are prepared to
believe about their leaders (in regards to the
privileged life).*!?

Minor Hypotheses
The statistical and narrative material was presented in this
thesis in order to investigate the major hypotheses set forth in
Chapter I.

However, in the course of their investigation, several minor

hypotheses could not help but have been investigated due to their related
subject material.

It is the discussion of these that this conclusion

covers now.
*
Though the basis of this rumor is unknown, it v/as Khrushchev who
forced the top elite to move out of the Kremlin and live closer to the
common people.
17
Robert Kaiser, op. cit., p. 188.

Ikl
!•

The Soviet government elite is powerless in Soviet politics.
Though this hypothesis is not totally rejected, the
evidence gathered indicated that this may not always he the
case.

The Soviet government elite do display some power in

the political system; the dilemma is how much?
Chapter II brought out that though bills or resolu
tions are not usually initiated by deputies of the Supreme
Soviet, the deputies can enter into the discussion of them
in the Commissions or sub-Coramissions and have some influence
in the final form of a bill.
for their constituents.

Also, they do act as ombudsmen

In Chapter III, the status and high

regard of the Council of Ministers members as with its
Presidium members (in Chapter IV) hints at the possession of
political power, but to what degree?

Also v/hereas most of

the bills of the Council which are sent to the Supreme Soviet
are initiated by Party directives, the overlapping membership
betv/een the Central Committee, its Secretariat, and/or
v

Politburo and the Council of Ministers brings up the question
of who initiates what and when!
available to answer that.)

(However, evidence is un

Since one wrong move may mean a

career in Soviet politics, the longevity in office of these
ministers speaks by itself of the possession of some form of
power, either personal, public, or both.
The status of government officials is also increasing
in the Soviet political system.

With the increase of their

membership in the Central Committee and Politburo, this seems
as a legitimizing effect of the power of the Soviet government

and of its importance to the party to control.

With Leonid

Brezhnev now a government official and the status of Alexis
Kosygin, the entire government apparatus seems to be taking
on the appearance of a power center.

The fact that state

officials are beginning to have larger representation in
elite Party bodies and are able to hold on to their posi
tions for a rather long period of time plus being accepted
as members of the upper political elite implies that governofficials in the Soviet political system are not powerless.
All Union political institutions, except the Politburo, have
only *rubber stamp* power.
The case of this hypothesis is unique.

The evidence

gathered showed that in some cases this hypothesis was sup
ported while in others it was rejected.

The unmentioned

power behind all the All Union political institutions is the
upper Party elite or Politburo members.

The fact that they

hold membership in nearly every body discussed causes this
hypothesis to be supported.

Since major decisions of either

government, economic, or Party nature have already been dis
cussed and decided upon by them, the passage of these deci
sions in the form of resolutions or bills in either hierarchy
is only a formal process to be carried out.

Even the Council

of Ministers, though not fitting the assembly image, usually
only draws up bills or resolutions after Party directives
have been received.
On the other hand, these institutions can contribute
to these decisions and in some cases even make them.

Supreme

Soviet deputies are allowed to discuss matters in committees*
The Party Congress does allow various members to speak in.
front of a full sitting, along with the top Party officials.
As mentioned, the longevity and professionalism of the Council
of Ministers emanates some form of power and possible program
initiation.

The Presidiumsmay have the least amount of actual

domination, but by their existence, display some control over
their respective assemblies.

The Central Committee is admit*
tedly used at times to settle disputes of fate of leaders.
This hypothesis, while generally accepted in the West, has
been shown to not always be the case in Soviet politics.
3,

Political behavior as it appears in the Soviet Union demon
strates the desire of the political elite for power and status
in Soviet society.
Acceptance was the outcome of the investigation con
cerning this hypothesis in this paper.
the evidence in detail that supports it.

Chapter V presents
Covert maneuvering,
j

accepted methodology, stiff competition, and jealously are
part of the political life of the Soviet political elite in
order to attain power.

Double standards, a complete separa

tion of private and public lives, and a profession (though
possibly not belief) of dedication to Communist ideals is the
common pattern followed in order to attain political status.
The Soviet political elites are ambitious, power-hungry, and

This refers to the case of Nikita Khrushchev in 1957 and the case
of Georgi Malenko earlier, in 1955-

lMf
status seekers with the goal of upward political mobility
dominating their lives.
Patronage is the overriding factor in political mobility in
the Soviet political system.
Support for this hypothesis was found throughout this
thesis.

In an oligarchical, totalitarian state such as the

Soviet Union, connections or friends are very important in
order to maintain or advance ones status.

When power is as

precarious as discussed under Major Hypotheses No. 4, those
involved place great importance upon gaining supporters both
superior and inferior to them in order to have some form of
job security.
In Soviet elections, having a patron-client relation
ship with the proper level of Party elite could enhance ones
opportunity for candidature for a desired position, while the
nomeklatura system operates like a self-perpetuating, selfselecting fraternity, a closed corporation with the Party
(

bosses at all levels making the important decisions.
age can play a large role in those decisions.

18

Patron

In top elite

positions, while packing the Party and state bodies with
members of their own factions and demoting those who were not
entirely dependent upon them, first Stalin and then Khrushchev
1^
was able to rise to a position of all encompassing power. '

18Hedrick
.
Smith, op. cit., p. 105193Philip Stewart and others, MPoli
"Political Mobility - Soviet Political
Process", American Political Science Review (December, 1972), p. 1270.

Ik5

Brezhnev, too, in recent years, using the same method, has
enhanced his power and presently is recognized as the leader
of the Soviet Union, both inside and outside the country.
In a study entitled "Political Mobility-Soviet Politi
cal Process” , the authors found that the significance of
patronage on political mobility was higher during the periods
of "unchallengeable” power of Stalin and Khrushchev than during
the Brezhnev-Kosygin era.

Due to the latter findings, they

state that the significance of patronage on political mobility
in Soviet politics is probably overestimated (they see per20
formance as significant if not more so).
However, their
data only covered the Brezhnev-Kosygin era for three years,
1 9 6^-67*

During that period, as discussed in Chapter IV,

Brezhnev did not begin to display his influence or make full
use of the patronage system.

It was not until the early

seventies that being assured of his power, he began to bring
supporters into the Politburo and other memberships.

There

fore, this research contradicts the conclusions of the above
article, offering the summation that while performance does
have a significance on political mobility, patronage is the
overriding factor in it in the Soviet political system.
5.

Ideological orientation is the guiding force in the life of
the Soviet political elite.
As the discussions of Major Hypotheses 3 and

relate,

the results of the investigation and subsequent evidence in

20Ibid., pp. 1279-12.8^.
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the paper shows that the guiding force in the life of the
political elite appears to be material success rather than
ideological orientation.

V/ith the prevalence of leading a

double life for most political elites in that official duties
or policy often conflicts with personal beliefs and with the
great emphasis placed on personal comfort, that dedicated,
ideological person does not seem to exist within this group.
Rather than distribute wealth and privileges among the people,
as would go along with Marxist idealism, Chapter V related how
those in the privileged class guard their benefits jealously,
similar to those of the older generation who intensely guard
their positions of power from the intrusion of the young.
If an ideological orientation is to be the motivating
force in the lives of the Soviet political elite, it would be
a rationalization on the progress of Soviet society toward
communism, dominated by a fervent display of patriotism for
the Motherland.

To the Soviet citizen as well as the elite,

the Motherland is an endearing part of their lives; they
think.their country is 'something special'.

21

This usually

does not reflect the Communist ideology of the Party programs,
but the love of Russia herself.

If a force beyond material

success drives a member of the All Union political elite, it
probably is more a love and respect for Russia than for the
totalitarian country of the Soviet Union.
23.
Robert Kaiser, op. cit., p. 190.
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Summation
The All Union Soviet political elite shows a surprising amount of
ability, educationally, professionally, and politically.

Their actions

may reflect Communist ideological goals, but more often, personal career
ambitions.

Though they may privately question their system of government,

publically, they vocally support it.

The intricacies, idiosyncrasies, and

conflicts of Soviet politics has forced these politicians to function in
a system where mistrust and unknowing are facts of life, non-success in an
assignment could end a career, and personal dignity is a virtue unknown.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
PARALLELISM OF HXERASCfilES
ALL UNION LEVEL
Party Hierarchy

State Hierarchy

Presidium of
Council of
Ministers

/
—
- Ar

Presidium
of Supreme
Soviet

Politburo
]

F

5

Central
Committee

Council of
Ministers

Supreme Soviet
Soviet of
the Union

Soviet of
Nat ionalit ie s

Party Congress

•Solid Arrows indicate ivoNtia/xl inferior body to n g m w &I superior
Broken Arrows indicate actual inferior body to actual superior
body.

SOURCE: Herbert McClosky and John Turner, The Soviet Dictatorship
(New York: McGraw-Hill, i9 6 0 ), pp. 205, 519- William A. McGenaghan,
Magruder's Government (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1 9 6 7 ), P* 25-
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APPENDIX C

SLAVIC CORE IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Members
Benediktov
Kosygin
Mikhailov
Patolichev
Pegov
Pospelov
Aristov
Beshchev
Brezhnev
Chernyshev
Goryachev
Grishin
Kapitanov
Kuznetsov
Ignatov
Organov
Puzanov
Rumyantsev
Shelepin
Suslov
Titov
Ustinov
Voronov
Yasnov
Yefremov
Voroshilov
Konev
KoroChenko
Korneichuk
Mikoyan
Snieckus
Kalnberzins
Kabin

Nationality
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russ5.an
Russian
Russian
Ukrainian
Ukrainian
Ukrainian
Armenian
Lithuanian
Latvian
Estonian

Four Comm.

Five Comm.
*
*
*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
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*
*
*

*
*
*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

*
*
*

*

*

*
*
*

*
*
*
*

1971
Elected

*
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APPENDIX C - Continued

Members

Nationality

Four Comm.

Five Comm.

1971
Elected

Reaching Four Time Committee Members in 1971
Dementyev
Furteseva
Gromyko
Kirilenko
Ponomarev
Sholnikov
Yefremov
Moskalenko
Podgorny
Polyansky
Titov
Mazurov
Dzhavkhishvili
Mzhavanadze
Nassr idinova
Kunayev

Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russian
Russi n
Ukrainian
Ukrainian
Ukrainian
Ukrainian
Belorussian
Georgian
Georgian
Uzbek
Kazakh

SOURCE: Joseph P. Mastro, "The Soviet Political Elite11 (unpublished
Ph.d. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), pp. 8 ^f, 8 6 .

APPENDIX D

LONGEVITY- OF POLITBURO MEMBERSHIP

Name
L.
A.
A.
A.
N.
D.
A.
P.
N.
M.
G.
K.
A.
V.
D.
V.
F.
y.
A.
A.
G.
D.

Brezhnev
Kirilenko
Kosygin
Mikoyan
Podgorny
Poliansky
Shelepin
Shelest
Shvernik
Suslov
V oronov
Mazurov
Pelshe
Grishin
Kunaev
She herb itsky
Kulakov
Andropov
Grechko
Gromyko
Romanov
Ustinov

1964

1967

1971

1973

Beg. 1976

Beg. 1977

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

-

-

-

X

X

X

-

X

X

X

-

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

-

X

X
-

X
-

-

-

-

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

-

-

X

X

-

—

X

X

X

X

—

X
-

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

-

-

X

X

X

X

-

-

X

X

X

X

-

-

X

X

X

X

X

X

-

-

X

X

X
-

-

-

X
-

X
—

X

-

-

-

-

-

-

--

-

X

Percents Of the 1977 Membership

-

33 %
bT/o
73%
%7%
87 ^

had
had
had
had
had

served
served
served
served
served

X

since
since
since
since
since

1964
1967
1971
1973
1976

SOURCE: Grey Hodnett, "Succession Contingencies in the Soviet
Union", Problems of Communism, March-April, 1975? P- 6 . Richard F.
Staar, ed., Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1975? 1976 ,
1977 (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1975? 1976, 1977)?
pp. 8 l, 69, 96.
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